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* Pr ofess or  of Law, J . Reube n Cla rk  Law S chool, Brigha m Youn g Un iversit y.
I  am grea tly indebted to Devin C. Wright, a th ird-year law stu dent a t th e J . Reuben
Cla rk Law School, Brigham  Young Un iversity , for h is a ssi st an ce in  th e pr epa ra tion
of this ar ticle. The responsibility for any errors is, of course, entir ely mine.
1. T h e idea is tha t th e piece of paper on which the bill “was written or pr inted
should  be tr eat ed as  if it—the  piece of paper —was it self th e claim or  debt  which  it
evidenced. This idea cam e to be known a s the  doctrine of merger—th e debt was
merged  in  the in st rume n t.” Gran t Gilm ore, Formalism  and t he Law  of Negotiable
Instruments, 13 CR E I G H T ON  L. RE V. 441, 449 (1979); see also RE S T AT E M E N T (SE C O N D)
OF  CONTRACTS  § 338 cmt. h (1981) (“Certain wr it i ngs  a re  t r ea t ed  in  the  ord ina ry
course  of bu sin es s a s s ym bols  of cont ra ctu al  r igh ts .”) ; E . AL L AN  F ARNSWORTH ,
CONTRACTS  § 11.7 (1982) (“[T]he right  is regar ded as in tima tely connected wit h  the
wr it i ng . . . . ”).
2. S ee U. C.C . § 3-2 01 (1 990 ).
3. S ee id . § 3-302.
4. The defenses tha t can be ra ised even against  a holder in due course a re
known  as “real” defenses and a re listed in UCC section 3-305(a)(1) (1990). They
include i n fa n cy, dur ess, la ck of capacit y, illegalit y, frau d in t he e xecut ion, an d
discha rge  in  i n solvency. Defenses not on this list ar e known as “personal” defenses
and cann ot be r aised  aga i n st a  hold er  in d ue  cour se.  Th ey in clud e “failu re  or la ck of
cons ide ra tion , b rea c h of wa rr an ty , u nco ns cion ab ilit y a nd  ga rd en  va ri et y fr au d (fr au d
in  t he in ducem ent ).” J A M E S  J . WH I T E  & ROBERT S. SUMMERS , UN I F O R M  COMMERC I AL
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I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 T h e concep t  of negot ia bil it y of promissor y n otes is  solidly
ent ren ched in Am er ican  comme rcia l law . It  der ives  from the
En glish  common law not ion  tha t  a  negotiable instr ument  is a
reifi ca t ion  of the obligat ion it d escrib es; t he  in s t rumen t  is  r e-
gard ed a s  a  t an g ible  form of the obliga t ion .1 Th is  not ion  has
mul tiple ram ifications, but t hree stan d out. The first is the
holder  in d ue  cours e doctr ine  wh ich a sse rt s t ha t, w h e n  a  nego-
t i able inst rument is transferred by the correct process (negotia -
t ion , wh ich  requir es  de live ry of the pape r )2 t o someone  wi th  the
righ t  qu a lit ies  (good fa it h , la ck of not ice,  and p aym en t  of
value),3  t h e maker  of the instru ment m ay not raise against the
holder  mos t  of the  common defenses  to payment  that would
have been a sser ta ble agains t t he original pa yee.4 Th is  doct r ine
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CODE  § 14-9  (3d e d. 1 988 ).
5. The origina l ne goti ab le in st ru me nt s we re  “inla nd  bills  of exchan ge,” typically
issued  by mer chan ts, bu t t he concept  was e xte n d ed  t o p romisso ry no tes  by the  end
of the  e igh teen th cen tu ry. Th e hist ory of the h older in  due cour se doctr ine is
described in M.B.W. Sin clair,  Codificati on of  N egotia ble I ns tru m ent s L aw : A T ale of
Reiterated  Anachronism ,  21 U. TOL . L. RE V. 625 (1990) and  Edwa rd L. Ru bin,
Learn ing From  Lor d  Mansfield: Toward a Tran sferability Law For Modern
Comm ercial Pra ctice , 31 ID AH O L. RE V. 775  (199 5).
UCC Article 3 deals only with ne gotiable instr ume nts , since under  UCC sect ion 3-
104(b) (1990), “ ‘[i]nstrument ’ means a n egotiable instr u m ent .” Thus, n on-negotia ble
notes  ar e out side Ar ticle 3’s scope. S ee U. C.C . § 3-1 04 cm t.  1 (19 90).
6. In  th e a bse nce  of th e h olde r in  du e cou rs e doct ri ne , th e se cond a ry  market
inv est or  c a n  de m a nd t ha t t he  ma ke r of t he  not e giv e a n e st oppe l st at em en t b efor e
the investor makes the purchase. Such a statem ent avers tha t th e n ote is en forceable
and that t he maker  has n o  defenses to it. In some respects th e estoppel statem ent
is bett er pr otection for t he in vestor  th an  th e holder  in due course doct ri ne ; it  pr ote cts
the investor agains t “real” as well as “personal” defense s , a n d  it  i s no t  sub ject  t o
a t tack on  the  t echn ica l  ground tha t  some  e r r an t l anguage in  the no te r ender s  it  non-
negotiable. None the le s s,  such  st a t ement s seem t o be obtain ed only in  closely-
negotiated, no n-r ou ti ne  pu rch as es  of notes  from p ar ties  oth er t ha n cons um ers . S ee
Ronald  J .  Mann , Searching For Negotiability in Paym e n t  an d  Cred it S yst em s, 44
UCLA L. RE V. 951 , 97 5 n .80  (199 7).
7. S ee id . at 957-58.
8. S ee U.C .C. § 3-3 01 (19 90); G RA N T S. N E L S O N  & DA LE  A. WHIT MAN , RE A L
E STATE  F I N AN C E  LAW  § 5.34 (3d ed. 1993). Pre-U.C.C. law was the s am e. S ee United
Stat es Na t’l Bank  v. Holt on, 195 P . 823 (Or. 1 921). 
9. S ee NELSON  & WHIT MAN , supra note 8, § 5.34; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
Ticor  Title Ins. Co., 943 P.2d 710 (Wash . App.  1997 ); RE S T AT E M E N T (SE C O N D) OF
is firmly (if complexly) esta blished by Article 3 of the Un iform
Comm ercia l Code (U CC). 5 Negotiability has t ra ditionally been
regarded a s a  gr ea t  a id  to commer ce, s in ce it  reli eve s t he s ec-
onda ry mar ket  pu rch as er of th e ins tr um ent  of the n eed t o in-
ves t igat e its en forceability by cont acting t he m ak er. 6 Thus,
reifi ca t ion  of th e debt in  th e paper  ha s been  t h ou ght  to serve a
useful commer cial purp ose.7
A second r am ification of th e “reified obligat ion” prin ciple
involves compet ing  tr ans fe r s of t he  in s t rumen t . In  g en era l , the
righ t  to paym ent  un der t he ins tr um ent  ma y be gained only by
acqu ir in g pos se ss ion  of th e pa pe r  docu men t . E ven  if some other
form of tr an sfer  (e.g., a se pa ra te  wr itt en  docum en t of as sign -
men t ) migh t  be  en forcea ble  for  som e pu rp oses, it  is clea r  tha t  a s
between  compet ing assignees, the one who has acquired the
document its elf will pr eva il. T h is pr inciple is  emb odied in  Art i-
cle 3 for  holders in  due course, 8 bu t  is  a lso wid ely  followed  for
i n st r u men t s tha t  a re n ot  t ech nica lly  negot ia ble  or  tha t  a re n ot
held in du e cour se as d efined in Article 3.9
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CONTRACTS  § 342(b)(iv) (1981). An except ion is som etim es m ade if th e first
ass i gn m e n t is recorde d with out d elivery of th e not e, an d th e not e is su bsequ ent ly
delivered to a s econd a ssign ee. S ee NELSON  & WHIT MAN , supra note 8, § 5.34.
10. S ee d is cuss ion  infra  Pa rt  III.A.
11. S ee F ARNSWORTH , supra  not e ?, § 11 .7 (“[T]he  obligor  wh o r ender s
per form an ce to a pe rson  who does n ot pr oduce th e writ ing does s o at h is per il,
regardless of th e la ck of n oti fica ti on .”).
12. F o r consu m er t ra nsa ctions, t he h older in  due cour se doctr ine wa s effectively
eliminated  in  1975 by  th e F ede ra l Tr ad e Com mi ssi on’s ru le on  “Pr ese rv at ion of
Consumers’ Claims a nd Defenses.” 16 C.F.R. § 433.1-.2 (1997). Br oad e r  a t t acks  on  the
doctrine, suggesting that it  has no important r ole even in non-consum er t ran sactions,
a re found  in  Mann , supra  note 6,  a t 100 3. See also J am es S. Roge rs, An  Es say  on
Horseless Car ria ges a nd  Pap erles s N egot iable Instruments: Some Lessons from the
Article 8 R evis ion , 31 ID AH O L. RE V. 689 (1995); Ja mes Steven  Rogers, T h e Irr eleva nce
of Negotiable Instruments Concepts in the Law of th e Ch eck-B ased  Pay m ent  S yst em ,
65 TE X. L. RE V. 929 , 94 5 (19 87).
13. The paym ent  ru le ma y be seen as  a corollary of the holder in due course
doct r i n e itse lf. S ee Sincla ir, supra  not e 5, at  625 n .16 (discus sing G ilmor e, supra  no t e
?, at 448-50). But in m odern law th ere is an im portan t difference, for th e holder  in
due cours e doctr ine on ly app lies t o negot iable in str um ent s, wh ile th e paym ent  ru le
is widely a pplied  to both  negot iable a nd n on-negot iable n otes. S ee infra  P art  III.A-B.
The th ird  re su lt of viewin g a  negotiable instr ument  as a
“reified obligation” is the su bject of this a rt icle. I refer t o i t  he re
simply as  th e “paym ent  ru le.” In su bsta nce, th i s ru le holds  tha t
once an  inst rument  has been delivered to an a ssignee, one who
ma kes  paym ent  on th e debt r epres ent ed by the  in s t rumen t  t o
anyone other  than  the p oss es sor  of the in st rumen t  doe s s o a t
h is or her  peril. The pa yment  is not bindin g on the p ossessor
unless actu ally forwa rded  to him or h er. This is so despit e th e
fact  th at  th e payor m ay not k now of th e t r an sfer, ha ving never
been notified of it  by e it her  the or igina l payee  or  the tr an sferee.
This  view seems r equired  by Art icle 3 for n otes t h a t  fi t  it s defi-
n it ion  of negotia bilit y,10 bu t  is  commonly a dop ted  wit h  res pe ct
to n on-negot iable n otes a s well. 11
The fir st  of thes e t h ree  res u lt s of “r eifi ca t ion ” of the  ob liga -
t ion , the  holder  in  due cours e  r u le , i s under  s t rong  a t t ack 12 on
the grounds t h a t  it  is  ir r ele va nt , u nnecess ary, a nd ou t  of touch
with  moder n comm ercia l pr act ice. Litt le h as b een  sa id  abou t
the second rule, which tr eats tr ansfer of the pap e r  a s t he best
or  on ly way to t r ans fe r  the obligat ion. My pu rp ose in t his  ar ti-
cle is  to address and a tt ack th e th ird r ule, which in effect r e-
quires  the  payor  of a  note  to make  no payments  withou t  first
dem an din g to see  th e not e its elf, in orde r t o confir m t ha t t he
payee st ill holds it .13 I  propose to deal with the rule principally
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14. S ee infra Par t III.A-B.
15. S ee infra Par t III.C.5.
16. S ee infra  Par t III.C.1-3.
in  th e cont ext of mortgage law, since th at  is wher e i t  ne a r ly
always cau ses t rouble in pr actice.
The payment  ru le  a r ises in  the followin g scen ar io. Mor t -
ga gor  borrows money from Mortga gee, giving a  p romissory  note
secured  by a mort gage. The note ca lls for r egu lar  mon th ly pa y-
men t s of p r incipa l  and in teres t , which  Mor tgagor  pays  in  a
tim ely ma nn er. Su bsequen tly, Mortgagee tr an sfe r s t he  note  to
Assign ee, de liver ing p osses sion of it a nd  per ha ps e xecut ing a nd
record ing an  ass ignment  of the mor tgage  as well. Assignee does
not  make  Mor tgagee an  agent  for p urpos es  of collect ion  of th e
deb t . No one gives Mortgagor  not ice  of the  ass ignment ,  and
Mor tgagor  con t inu es to ma ke regu lar p aymen ts t o Mort gagee.
La ter , Mort gagor d ecides t o pay off the d ebt  in full a nd  makes
the pa ymen t t o Mortga gee. When  making the  final  paymen t ,
Mor tgagor  does not  a sk  to see  the  n ot e, b u t  reli es  on
Mortgagee’s assura nce that th e note will be return ed an d a
formal dischar ge of the mortgage will be forwarded to
Mor tgagor  in due course. However, Mort gagee does not forward
the final paymen t t o Assignee. Instea d, Mor tgagee absconds
with  the funds or becomes insolvent . Assign ee  contact s
Mor tgagor  an d dem an ds t ha t Mor tga gor pa y th e debt  in  full t o
Assignee; if Mortga gor fails t o do so, Assign e e t h r ea t ens to
foreclose th e m ort gage or  br ing a n a ction a gain st  Mort gagor  on
the debt . Under  th e paym ent  ru le, ther e is an  excellent
pr obabilit y th at  Assigne e will pr evail in  a for eclosure a ct ion  or
a  su it  on  the  debt .
Many varia tions on t his scena rio may occur . Among them
ar e t he  followin g:
a . Th e  ob lig a tion  u n d e rt a k en  b y M or t ga g or  m a y  or  m a y  n ot
b e  a  n e go t ia b l e i n s t r u m e n t .14
b . T h e n ot e  m a y be  ass igned  ou t r igh t ,  o r  m ay  ins tea d  be
p ledged a s  a  “col l a t e ra l  a s s ignm en t”  to  secu re  som e  o the r
ob liga t ion  owed  by  Mor tgagee  to  Ass ignee .15
c. Mor tgagee  m a y  b e a n  i n di vi du a l , a  g e n e ra l  bus iness
corp ora tion , or a  com m er cial  len din g in st itu tion .16
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17. S ee infra  Par t III.C.3.
18. S ee infra  Par t III.C.4.
19. I have t augh t  t he paymen t rule in man y continuing legal education courses,
and lawyers in th e audience ha ve often expres sed incredulity tha t it is or could be
the la w. T hi s la ck of a wa re ne ss  se em s bor ne  out  by t he  fact  th at  in m an y of  the
reported  cases, the person er roneously makin g the paym ent wit hout dem anding t o see
the not e is a  lawye r. S ee cases cited infra note ?.
20. S ee Hu sse y v. J acob , 91 Eng. Rep. 954, 955 (1696) (“[A] bill  of exch an ge on ce
accepted by a r espon sible m an , is of such  credit  am ong t ra der s, th at  i t  passes  as
d . When  Mort gagee r eceives  the  inst al lm ent  paym en t s  fr om
M or t g a go r, M or t g ag ee  m a y o r  ma y  no t  e s t ab l i sh  a  pa t t e rn
o f forwa rd ing  th em to  Ass ignee .17
e . T h e cont rov er sy b et we en  Mor tg ag or a n d  Ass ignee  m ay
focu s  on  in st al lm en t p ay m en ts  th at  Ass ign ee  h as  n ot
re ceive d, or  on  th e fin al  pa ym en t, or  on  bot h .18
The paym ent  ru le seems bizar re in  light  of the vir tu ally
un iversa l view of la wye rs a nd a cade mics  (not  t o m e ntion  lay
persons who a re  asked to express  an  opin ion  on  the  ma t t e r )
tha t  allowin g Assignee  to collect  t h e  debt  a s econd t ime is
un just ifiable and un conscion able. I believe t ha t p erm itt ing
Assignee to pr evail  is wrong, ir res pe ct ive  of an y or  a ll of t he
factors m e n tion ed  above . In  a llow in g Assign ee  to collect  the
debt  a  se cond t im e t he la w is , I s uggest , ser iou sly ou t  of t ouch
with  modern  rea lit y. Th e paym en t  ru le i s n ot  mer ely  out  of da te
and us eless ; it is a ffirm a t ively noxious a nd h ar mful. It pla ces a
poten tia lly devas t a t in g r i sk  on  the  payor ,  and imposes an
effective du ty on  the  payor  t h a t  vir tua l ly  no l ay person  and
rela tively  few la wye rs w ould  unde rst and or  exp ect .19 That  risk
could be elim ina ted by r equirin g the a ssignee t o take t he
ine xpen sive and simple step of giving mailed notice of t he
t r ans fe r  t o t he  note ’s  maker .
As one of th e two co-reporter s of th e R estat em ent (T h ird) of
Property (M ortgages), wh ich wa s pu blish ed in  1997, I  ha ve
at tem pted  to encourage change in  th is  a rea  of t he law , both  in
the con ten t  of the  R estat em ent an d other wise. Th is  a r t icle i s the
s tory  of t ha t  effor t .
II. TH E  H I S T O R I C  OR IG I N  OF  T H E  “SY M B O L I C  WR I TI N G”
DO C TR I N E
 At  common  law, bills  of excha nge (given  in p a ym en t  for  the
sales  of goods) were rega rded  as n egotiable,20 but at  the end of
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cur ren t  as  re ad y m on ey,  an d is  ne gocia te d [s ic] fr om  o n e t o  an othe r t hr ough a ll
Eur ope, an d e xch an ged  up on  va lu ab le con sid er at ion  . . . . ”).
21. S ee Clerke v. Mar tin, 92 En g. Rep. 6 (1700 ); see generally J A M E S ST E VE N
RO G E R S , TH E  E ARLY H I S TO R Y O F  T H E  LA W  OF  BILLS  AND NO T E S 177-86 (1995)
(expla in ing the reasoning of seventeenth century courts holding that pr omissor y  n ot es
a re no t n egot ia ble ).
22. S ee Ni cho lso n v . Se ldn it h,  91 E ng . Re p. 6 95,  695  (K.B . 16 92).
23. 3 & 4 An ne , ch . 9 (1 704 ).
24. S ee Hussey , 91 Eng. Rep. at 954.
25. 45 & 46  Vict ., ch . 61  (188 2).
26. S ee J O H N W. CRAWFORD, TH E  NEGOTIABLE  IN S T R U M E N T S  LAW , Preface (1st
ed. 1897 ); J A M E S BARR AME S E T AL ., TH E  NE G O T IA BL E  IN S T R U M E N T S  LAW WITH
COMMENTS  AND CR I T I C IS M S iii (1 908 ). Bot h o f these sou rce s su mm ar ize t he  his tor y of
the Negotiable Ins tru men ts La w.
27. 7 N.Y. 141 (1852). The Massachusett s Supreme Court  had applied the
paymen t ru l e even  ea r li er  i n  Wheeler v. Guild ,  37 Mass. (20 P ick .) 54 5 (18 38).
However , th e case in volved an  un secur ed pr omissor y note,  no t  a mor tgage loan ,  and
the paym ent  by th e debt or was  ma de, not  to th e origina l pa yee  of t he  note , bu t  t o
an  individu al m embe r of th e law firm  to which  it h ad bee n colla t e r a lly a s s igned . The
cour t  found t hat  the individual lawyer h ad no au thority to receive paymen t on be ha lf
of t h e  fi r m  an d t ha t “t he  pa ym en t m us t b e con sid er ed  as  ma de  at  th e r isk  of th e
pa r ty payin g; and a s th e par ty r eceiving, in fa ct ha d no r ight  to receive paymen t ,
the seven t eent h cent ur y, the common law court s, ra th er
su rp ris ingly,  he ld  tha t  p r omissory n otes were n ot negotiable.21
Notes  were regarded as mer e “choses  in  act ion ,” and  hence  were
n ot  as sign ab le a t a ll, mu ch les s a ssign ab le in  a w ay t ha t  w ou ld
free th e assign ee from th e ma ker ’s defenses.22 This  res ult
conflicted  wi th  broadly-held  com m e r ci a l e xp ect a t i on s .
Par l iament re spon ded  imm edia te ly by en a ct i ng the St at ut e of
Anne,23 wh ich m ad e pr omiss ory n otes as sign able , alt hou gh it
did  not give assignees express  immunity  from the  maker ’s
defenses. The holder  in du e cour se doctrine, giving a holder
freedom  from the  maker ’s  defe n ses, wa s r ecognized b y th e
comm on  law courts  in 1696,24 bu t  was  not  ensh r ined in s t a tu t e
un t il 1882 in  the E nglish  Bil ls  of Exchange  Act .25 In t he Un ited
Stat es, John W. Crawford was a ppoin te d in  1895 by t he
Conference of Commiss ioners on  Uniform S ta te Laws  to d ra ft
wha t  becam e t he  Negot iab le In st ru me nt s La w (N.I.L .), wh i ch
closely followed t he Bills  of Exchan ge Act an d u ltim at ely
imposed the  holder  in  due cours e d oct r in e in  eve ry Am er ica n
sta te. 26
The origins of th e paym ent  ru le in America ar e obscur e,
p r obably  because it  was regarded as intr insically related to t he
holder  in  du e cou rse  doct r in e. T he ea r lie st  Amer ica n  case
app ly ing i t  appea r s to be Brown v. Blyd enburg ,27 decided  by th e
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such  paymen t an d receipt did not discharge th e note,  as a gain st t he t ru e owne r.” Id .
a t  554.
28. S ee Blydenburg , 7 N .Y.  at 145.
29. S ee id .
30. S ee id. at 146
31. Id . 
32. G a r r et t  v. Fe rn au ld, 5 7 So. 6 71, 6 72 (F la.  1912 ); see also Bra yley v. Ellis ,
32 N. W. 2 54,  255  (Iow a 1 887 ).
33. S ee ME L VI L LE  M. BIGELOW , TH E  LA W  OF  BILL S , N O T E S, AND CH E Q U E S 273
(1900) (“[T]he part y paying should require the paper t o be delivered u p to  h im as  the
final  as su ra nce  of hi s d isch ar ge. I f he  sh ou ld fail t o do so, . . . th e tr ue own er . . .
could enforce a not her  paym ent .”); M. D. CHALMERS , TH E  LA W  OF  BI L LS  O F  E XCHANGE
234 (1881) (“Paymen t in order to operate as a  discharge of the b il l mus t  be made  to
the holder  or to som e per son a ut horized  to re ceive paym ent  on his  beh alf.”); see also
WILLI AM  E VERETT BRITTON , BILLS  AND NO T E S § 270  (194 3).
34. S ee Fo st er  v. C ar son , 28  A. 35 6, 3 56 (P a. 1894) (holding t he pa ymen t r ule
ina pplicable  to b ond s); see generally Brown v. Blydenbur gh, 7 N.Y. 141 (1852) (holding
the paymen t  ru le applicable to bonds). The ra tionale of the pa yment  rule wa s
confined to  negot i able in st rumen t s  in  Wheeler v. Guild , 37 Mass. (20 P ick.) 545, 554
(183 8); Hol lin sh ead  v. J ohn  S tu art  & Co. , 77 N.W. 89 , 93 (N.D. 189 8); and Koen v.
Mi ller , 150  S.W . 41 1, 4 12 (Ar k.  191 2).
New York Court  of Appeals in 1852. Ther e th e mort gagee had
ass igned t he debtor’s bond and  mortga ge, but th e debtor was
not  not i fi ed  of t he  a ss ignmen t .28 The deb tor  pu rpor t ed to pa y off
the  debt  by a  t r ans fe r  of the  rea l e sta te  to the mort gagee29 — in
other words , a de ed in  lieu of foreclosu re. Th e court  held  th at
the pur ported p aymen t wa s ineffective again st t he a ssignee.30
The cour t r egard ed th e debtor as ne gligent  in m ak ing t he
payment wit hou t ver ifying t ha t  t h e mor tgagee s t il l had  the
bond: “[I] t  is  again st  all pr obabilit y th at  [th e mor tga gor] would
ha ve pa id t he  debt  . . . with out  inqu iry for h is bon d.”31
This  negligence rat ionale was em ployed  by m ost  of th e other
ear ly cases. The court s rea soned th at  by failing to dem an d
sur ren der or disp lay of th e note wh en mak ing the  paymen t , the
mor tgagor  had “not used due diligence in protect ing h i s
rights”32 and  hence  cou ld not  complain of having t o pay twice.
This  view was fir mly est abli sh ed  by t he be gin n in g of the
tw en tie th  cent ur y.33
The fact  tha t  the  debt  in  Br own  v. B l yd enbu rg was
repr esent ed by a b ond, r a t h e r  than  a promissory note, is of
some int e res t . Dur ing the  n ine t een th  cen tu ry op in ions  va r ied
as to whethe r  t he  paymen t  rule was  limit ed t o negotia ble
ins tru ments,  or whet her  it also app lied to non-negotiable
evidences of debt, such as bonds.34 Dur ing th e twen tieth
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35. S ee discu ssi on  infra  Pa rt s II I.A & B . Th e u se of b ond s a s ev ide nce  of
mort gage  deb t h as  bee n s up pla nt ed b y pr omi ssor y n ote s in  mos t ju ri sdi ction s, s o th at
it  is difficult to find modern cases dealing with bonds.
36. The Negot iable I nst ru men ts L aw (N.I .L.), ad opted in  1897,  embod ied  the
paymen t rule in the following sections: “The  holder  o f a  negot iable  ins t rument  may
sue thereon in his own nam e; and payment t o him in due cour se  di scha rges  the
inst ru men t.” N.I.L. § 51 (1897). It is in ter estin g t hat  this section, like t he 1990
ver sion  of U.C.C. § 3-602, does not sa y th at  only pa ym en t t o th e h olde r ca n  discha rge
the instrumen t, but that  seems to have been  its in ten t. Th e N.I.L. bu tt res sed t his
unde r st and ing by expres sly au th oriz ing  th e pa yor  to d em an d t he  not e: “The
inst rumen t mus t  be exhib ited  to th e per son fr om wh om pa ymen t is d ema nde d, an d
when  it is paid must  be delivered up to th e pa rt y pa yin g it .” N.I .L.  § 74 (1 897 ).
Fin ally, pa ym en t in  du e cou rs e wa s de fine d a s pa ym en t “t o t h e  h olde r t he re of in g ood
faith  an d w it ho ut  no ti ce t ha t h is t it le i s d efe cti ve. ” N.I .L.  § 88 (1 897 ).
Article  3(I cha nge d from  2) of the U niform  Comm ercial Code  was or iginally
promulgat ed in 195 2. In  its p re-199 0 ver sions , the U.C.C. ad opted t he pa ymen t r ule
in  § 3-603 (1): “The liability of any par ty is discharged to the ext ent of his payment
or  s a t is fac tion  to t he h old er . . . .” U.C.C. § 3-603(1) (empha sis a dded ). O n ce  a g a in ,
th is lan gu age  does  not  ma ke  it cl ea r t ha t p aym en t t o the hold er  is t he  sole  me th od
of discha rgin g th e debt , but  it is ge ner ally so u nde rst ood. 
37. U.C.C. § 3-60 2(a ) (199 0).
38. Id . § 3-301. Of course, payment  t o  an  a u t h or ized agen t of such a  pers on will
also suffice. S ee text  accompa nyin g infra notes 49-54.
cen tu ry tha t  deba te has  la rge ly disapp ear ed, supp lant ed by th e
fair ly con s is t en t view t ha t t he p aym ent  ru le ap plies t o all
pr omissor y n otes , wh et her  negot ia ble  or  not .35
III. TH E  P A YM E N T  RU L E
A. N egotia ble N otes
 In  the Unit ed S ta tes , the  payment  ru le has  been  an in t r ins ic
component  of the la w of negotia ble not es sin ce negotia bility
bega n  to receive  un ifor m st a tu tory r ecogn it ion .36 The 1990
vers ion of UCC Art icle 3, curr ent ly in  effect, governs  negot iable
instrum ents. Article 3 is widely underst ood a s  adop t ing  the
payment rule, although the logic of its la n g uage is  fair ly
convoluted.  Three  di ffe ren t  sect ion s mu st be r ead t ogether.
Section  3-602 provides tha t  an  ins t rument  i s pa id  “to the  ex ten t
payment is made . . .  to a person entitled t o en force  the
inst rumen t.”3 7  Under UCC section 3-301, “person entitled to
enforce” an  inst rument  means (with certa in exceptions not h ere
re leva nt ) eith er “the h older of th e inst ru men t” or “a nonholder
in  possession of th e inst ru men t  w h o has the r ights of a
holde r.”38 Thu s, section 3-301 t i es  t he en forcemen t  r ight  t o
posses sion of the  paper .  F ina l ly, UCC section 3-203(a) provides
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39. U.C.C. § 3-20 3(a ) (199 0).
40. S ee supra note 36.
41. F o r eviden ce of the w ide a ccepta nce of th at  pre mis e, see infra  note 137.
42. S ee, e.g., Ta ylor  v. Roe der , 360  S.E .2d 1 91, 1 93-94  (Va. 19 87); Gr oover  v.
Peters,  202  S.E .2d  413 , 41 4 (Ga . 19 73).
43. S ee, e.g., Goetz v. Selsor , 628 S.W.2d 404, 406  (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
tha t  wher e paym ent  was m ade p rior t o assign men t, as sign ee who was  not h older in
due cou rs e was  bou nd  by p ay me nt ).
44. S ee RE S T AT E M E N T (SE C O N D) O F  CONTRACTS  § 338(4 ) (1981 ); In re Columb ia
Pac . Mort g., Inc., 22 B .R. 753, 755 (Bank r. W.D. Wa sh. 198 2). An inte res tin g
counterpoise to th is widely-held  position is  provided  by Taylor v. R oeder , 360 S.E.2d
191 (Va. 1987). The court conceded that paym ent to the m ortgagee would have been
tha t  “[a]n  inst ru men t is  tr an sfer re d wh en  it is  deliver ed by a
person other  than  it s i ss uer  for  the p urpos e of givin g t o the
per son r eceiving d eliver y th e r ight  to en force th e ins tr um en t.”39
Rather  oddly, Article 3 never overtly stat es wha t  s eems to be i t s
well-accepted prem ise: tha t pa yment  can be ma de only  t o t he
person wit h  pos se ss ion  of the in st rumen t . Th e p revious ver sion
of Article 3 was similar ly silent  on  tha t  p reci se  poin t.40
Nevertheless, virt ua lly al l th ose wh o deal wit h Ar ticle 3 r ead  it
as  if Section  3-602 sa id “only.”41
Some deci sions  reason  tha t  the  payment  ru le st ems from
the holder in du e course doct r ine.  They asser t  tha t  s ince
“paymen t” is a persona l defense an d hen ce can not be r aised
again st a  holder in du e cour se, only such holders  a r e  en t it l ed  to
make the  payor  p a y a g ain. 42 However, this view reflects a
misunders tand ing of th e holder in du e cour se doctrine.  The sor t
of “payment” to which this doctrine refers is payment m ade
before t he t r ansfe r  of the in st rumen t , wh ich  is  not  the t ype of
payment with wh ich we are concerned. 43 I t  is  not  the  holder  in
due cou r se doctr ine, but  th e “reified obligation” concept
embodied in  the s ect ion s of Article 3 quoted above, tha t imp oses
the paym ent  ru le for n egotiable notes. A “pers on ent it led to
en force,” who is required to possess t he note, h as t he ben efit  of
th e pa yme nt  ru le wh et he r or  not  he or  sh e is “in du e cour se.”
B. N on-N egotia ble N otes
 Two d is t inct t hem es ar e repr esen ted  in t he n on-Article  3
cases adop t ing  the payment ru le. On e t he me , by an alogy t o
Art icle 3, is t he “symb olic wr itin g” doctr ine. Th e not e is t he
reified obliga tion  an d can  be dis cha rge d only by p ayin g th e
person who ha s possession of the res .44 The second  them e is
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ineffective if the n ote h ad bee n n egotia b le  a n d  h en ce covered  by UCC Ar ticle 3. S ee
id . at 19 3. H oweve r, t he  not e pr ovide d for  a va ri ab le in te re st  ra te , an d t he  cour t
concluded tha t  i t  wa s n ot  negot iable. S ee id. at  194-95. The cour t r efused  to app ly th e
symbolic writ ing doctr ine, comm ent ing:
Assuming the a bstra ct correc t ness of tha t ar gumen t, it does not follow that
t h e m akers undert ook the further  obligation of making a month ly canvass
of all  inh ab ita nt s of t he  ea rt h in  ord e r  t o a sce r t a in  who the  holde r  migh t
be. In  the  absence o f no t ice to the m aker s tha t th eir debt ha d been
assigned, th ey were e nt it led to t he pr otection of th e ru le in Ev an s v . J oyn er
in  ma king good-faith  paym ent  to th e origina l payee of th ese n on-negotiabl e
notes.
Id . at 195.
45. 98 N. E.  457  (N. Y. 19 12).
46. Id . at  461. More r ecent  New York  case la w h as appar ently limited Clark  t o
negotia ble notes, although  it was certa inly not so limited by its term s. S ee Felin
Assoc., Inc. v. Rogers, 326 N .Y.S.2d  413 , 415  (App.  Div.  197 1) (“[P]a ym en t t o su ch a
payee [on a non -negotia ble in s t r u m e n t ] bin ds  the t r ansfe ree .” (qu ot in g 42 N .Y.  J U R .,
Negotiable Instruments § 582  (196 5)).
Older cas e la w wa s di vide d wit h r esp ect  to m ortgages secur in g bon ds  as  dis ti nct
from  no te s. (A bond is n on -ne got ia ble .) Compare Drobney v. Sullivan, 266 N.Y.S. 245
(Sup . Ct . 19 33) (applying sym bolic writin g ru le to mor tga ge bonds; a nd h olding th at
paymen t to one wh o  do es  n ot h old t he  bon d is  ne glig en t a nd  no t b in din g) wi th  Foster
v. Ca rs on, 2 8 A. 35 6 (P a. 1 894) (“[A]ctu al n otice  of th e a ssi gn me nt  is e sse nt ial  to t he
comp let ion  of th e con tr act  re lat ions  bet wee n t he  as sign ee a nd  th e m ort gag or,  a nd
cons eque nt ly, un til th at  ha s been  given, t he m ortga gor does n o wrong in  ma kin g
paymen t s to t he  mo rt ga gee .”).
Pr ofess or  Hann a commented on the distinction between notes and bonds:
[D]oes the actua l practice of men in the case of bond and  mort gage  go  as
far  as  th e pr act ice a s t o negot iab le p ap er [?] The re  th e pr act ice is  clea r, b oth
of re qu ir ing  del iver y on purcha se, and  of  requ ir ing su r rende r  on  paymen t .
How wit h b ond  an d m ort gag e? To w hat  end req u i r e t he  pape r s , o r  r equ ir e
to see them—apar t from bringing oneself within th ese cases, i.e., apart  from
practices which follow rather tha n precede the legal rules?
J O H N H A N N A, CASES AND MA T E RI A LS  O N  SE C U R I T Y  849-50 (2d ed. 1940). The
im por ta nce  of the distin ction is largely dissipated, since bonds are s o  r a r ely used  as
evid en ce of mortga ge debt  toda y.
negligence. It  is  said  to be  negl igen t  for  the p ayor  to pa y
without  de manding t o se e t he or igina l n ote,  th e r eby verifyin g
tha t  it is st ill in the h an ds of th e original payee. Perha ps the
lead ing case taking this view is Assets Realization Co. v.
Clark ,45 whe re t he cour t obse rved  th at  whe n fina l pa ymen t is
ma de, “the  ev idence  of the  debt  na tu ra l ly  an d  or dina rily is
produced  and d elivere d, a nd  th ere fore th e failu re t o do this  in
the absence of sufficient explana tion constitutes not ice which
ma kes  th e pa ymen t or  tr an sa ction unavai ling as aga ins t a  pr ior
as sign me nt  alt hou gh u nr ecorded .”46
These two th emes a re alt er  egos  of one  another . S ince  the
note its elf repr esen ts  an d r eifies th e debt , it is s up posedly
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47. S ee, e.g., Tilton v. Boland, 31  P.2d 657, 660 (Or. 1934) (notin g th at  au th ority
from  as sig ne e t o colle ct i nt er es t d oes  no t a ut ho ri ze a gen t t o colle ct p ri nci pa l).
48. S ee infra Par t III.C.2-3.
49. S ee, e.g., Fr ei v. Ha milt on, 601 P .2d 307, 30 9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (holding
tha t  th e a ut ho ri zed  ag en t ca n a ccep t p ay me nt s on  beh al f of as sig ne e of n ote but does
no t ha ve p owe r t o wa ive  acce ler at ion  of th e n ote ).
50. The Resta t emen t (S econ d) of A gen cy § 72 (1 958 ) re fer s t o th is t ype  of ag en cy
rela tions hip  as “infer red  au th orit y.” 
51. S ee WA RR E N A. SEAVE Y, H A N DB O O K O N  T H E  LA W  OF  AGENCY  § 8C (1 964 ).
52. S ee RE S T AT E M E N T (SE C O N D) O F  AGENCY  § 72 (1 958 ).
obvious tha t  d ischa rge  of t he  debt  with out  gett ing t he p ap er is
impossible; hen ce it is s aid  to be n egligent  for th e pa yor to fail
to dema nd t he n ote.
C. Variations on th e Them e: Agency, Non-Final Paym ents,
and Collateral Assignm ents
 It  is u niversa lly agreed th at  paym ent  to the au th orized
agen t  of th e note’s assignee will count  again st t he a ssignee.
Thus, if th e assign ee ma kes  the or igina l m or tga gee  an  agen t  for
colle ct ion  of the  note , a  payment  made  to the  mor tgagee a ft er
the ass ign men t  has occu r red  wil l be  effect ive  and b in ding on
the assignee. Ea rly cas es wer e extr eme ly par sim onious in
find ing an  agen cy r ela t ion sh ip  in  the a bs en ce of a  for m al
agreemen t ,47 while more r ecent cases s eem to bend  over
backw a r d t o find a n a gency r elat ionsh ip or a n es topp el aga ins t
th e assign ee.48
When  can  an  agency  relationship be found? The most
obvious case is t h a t  of exp res s a u thor it y, wher e t he a ss ign ee  of
the not e ha s in  fact a ut hor ized t he  mor tga gee to collect  the
note. 49 Two oth er forms of aut hority a re a lso recognized:
implied (or  as  the R estat em ent (S econd) of A gen cy calls it ,
“inferred”) au thor i ty5 0  and  apparen t  au thor i ty.  Al though  the
dist inct ion between  im pl ied  and a pp aren t  au thor it y is  often  not
rigor ously obs er ved by t he  court s, it  is n onet he less  not ewort hy.
Implied  au thor i ty i s s imply  the au thor i ty tha t  an  agen t
must  rea sonably be regar ded as ha ving in  order  to car ry out  his
or  her  expr ess  au th orit y.51 For  example , an  agen t with express
au thor i ty to collect  a  de bt  on b eh a lf of the prin cipal has  implied
au thor i ty to give the payor a  receipt a nd, if the pa yment  is in
full,  to ret ur n t he pa yor’s prom issory note an d relea s e  a ny
collater a l t h a t  was  he ld  to secure  payment .52 These act s  a r e
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53. S ee id . at  § 8; see also SEAVE Y, supra  note 51, § 8D.
54. S ee RESTATEMEN T (SE C O N D) O F  AG E N C Y  § 8 cmt. d (1958) (“In the usu al
ag en cy cas e, h owev er , lit tl e t ur ns  up on t he  dis ti nct ion. I n fa ct, t he  ele me nt s of
estoppel ar e so frequ ent ly pres ent  th at  th e court s ha ve rep eat edly stat ed tha t
appa ren t  au th or it y is  ba se d u pon  es top pe l.”).
55. S ee id. a t  § 8 c m t . a  (“[A]pparent au thority exists only with regard to those
w h o believe and h ave reason t o believe that  ther e is auth ority; there can be n o
appa ren t  au th or it y cr ea te d b y a n u nd iscl ose d p ri nci pa l.”).
under s tood by t he busines s com mun i ty to be a  na tu ra l pa r t  of
the p rocess of receiving paymen t; th e prin cipal is boun d by
these acts even if the agent ha d no specific express au thor i ty
with  res pect t o th em, or  even if t he p rin cipal h ad , with ou t  the
payor’s kn owledge, forbidden  th e agent  to do them .
Apparen t  au th orit y is concept ua lly qu it e d iffer en t . It  can
exist  wh en  no actua l a u thor it y, expres s or  im plied, has been
gran ted by the principal to the agent . It arises  in s t ead  from
some conduct of the principal that leads a  t h ird  pa r ty
rea sona bly to believe th at  a t ra ns act ion wit h t he a gent  will
bind  th e pr incipa l .53 For exam ple, if th e holder of a note an d
mor tgage writes  a lett er t o a borrower, telling th e borrower t ha t
paymen t s on  t h e loan ma y be mad e to XYZ Finan cial Services
Co., an y pa ymen ts  ma de by t he b orr ower t o XYZ will bind  t he
holder  even  th ough  the h old er  has in  fa ct  never  au thor ized  XYZ
to col lect  anyth ing,  and  indeed has  never  communica t ed with
XYZ at  all. Apparen t a ut hority is sim ilar t o estoppel, but t her e
is a theoretical difference: to establish  apparen t  au thor i ty,  the
t h ird  par ty who dea ls with t he a gent m ust  show th at  he or she
rea sona bly believed in  th e agen t ’s a u thor it y, bu t  need n ot  sh ow
any det r imenta l change of position in  re lian ce on t ha t b elief. In
most cases , of cours e, th ere  is ind eed d etr imen ta l relia nce, so
t h a t  the difference between apparent  auth ority and estoppel is
seldom of mu ch pra ctical importa nce.54
The R estat em ent (S econd) of A gen cy ta kes th e view t ha t
apparen t  au thor it y ca n  neve r  a r ise when  the exis t en ce of t he
pr incipa l is undisclosed.55 This seems u ndu ly narr ow and
appea r s to st em  from t he  view t ha t t he  th ird  pa rt y mu st  believe
tha t  an  agen cy r ela t ion sh ip  exist s,  in st ea d of m erely as su min g
tha t  th e agen t is  pr ope r ly a ct in g on  h is  or  her  own  beh a lf.
However , t he R estat em ent r ecognizes  tha t  many cour t s  do not
read th e concept so na rr owly an d th at  th ey often  find appa ren t
au thor i ty even  though  the exist ence of th e pr incipa l is
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56. S ee id. a t  § 8, cm t f (“ The ter m ‘appar ent a uth ority’ has been  broadly used
by th e court s to des cribe t he power  which a gent s ha ve in cr eating liability against
th eir  principals, although without au thority. Thus, it  has b e en  us ed a s a  ba sis  for
imposing liability upon an u ndisclosed principal (see § 195), as we l l a s  i n  a  va r ie ty
of other situa tions dealt with in Chapter  6, where policy consider a t ions  requ i re  tha t
the pr in cipa l sh ou ld b e li ab le for  un au th or ize d con du ct. ”).
undisclosed.56 This  is a n im portan t  poin t  in  the  presen t
ana lysis, sin ce th e a dverse cons equ ences  of the p aym ent  ru le
often  ar ise in  a  con text  in  which  the  payor  knows  noth ing about
the assig nm ent  of th e note a nd m ortgage, but  inst ead a ssu mes
tha t  th e original mort gagee st ill holds  th em a nd  is a ctin g for it s
own  accoun t .
It  is significant  that  both impli ed  a n d appa ren t  au thor i ty
a re tie d t o th e ord ina ry exp ecta tion s of people en gaged in  the
sor t  of business tha t th e supposed agent is conducting. In th e
case of imp lied a ut hor ity, bu sin ess e xpecta tion s a re u seful in
es tabl ish ing the s ort s of ancilla ry a cts t ha t t he a gent  will
typ ically engage in while performing under h is or her express
aut h or i ty . In the case of apparent au thority, business
exp ect a t ion s help t o show the scope of th e au t h or ity  tha t  the
pr incipa l’s conduct  l eads  othe r s to belie ve th e a gen t p osses ses . I
will suggest  below th at  in ligh t of th e very w idesp rea d pr act ice
of s econda ry mor tgage m ar ket  as sign ees d elegat ing full
se rvicing au thor i ty  to their mortgagee-assignors, and  in  li gh t  of
the equa lly  wid es pr ea d fa ilu re of m or tga gor s a nd  thei r  clos ing
agen t s to de mand e xh ibi t ion  of pr omissor y n otes before pa ying
off mort gagees, cour ts s hould be virtu ally compelled to find tha t
mor tgagees have implied or appar ent au thority to accept
payment on beha lf of t heir  ass ign ees in  a ll ca se s in  wh ich  the
as signm en t  is u nd isclosed t o th e m ort gagor . Fir st , howeve r, I
t u rn to an  ana lysi s of the  th ree  types  of au thor i ty and  consider
how they have fared in  th e case law dea ling with t he pa yment
ru le.
1. Express authority
 Of th e various t ypes of agen cy, expre ss a ut hor ity,  when
presen t , is  usu a lly  the easies t  to pr ove.  It  is  crea ted  by a n  ora l
or  writ ten  delega tion  of power  by th e pr incipa l to t h e  a gent. If
the as sign ee h as  ent ere d in to a  writ t e n serv icing agreement
with  th e origin al m ortgagee , as is very commonly the cas e,
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57. 741 S.W . 2d  896  (Mo. C t.  App . 19 87).
58. Id . at 897.
59. S ee id. 
60. See id .
61. 468 S.E .2d  359  (Ga . 19 96).
62. Id . at 361.
63. S ee id .
64. Id . at 360-61.
payment t o the m or tga gee  pr es en t s n o pr oble m, for  su ch
agreemen t s expressly au th orize the ser vicer t o collect principal
and interest.  Such a greemen ts a re a lmost u niversa lly used by
the Fed er al N at iona l Mort gage Ass ociation  (“FN MA”), th e
Federa l Home Loan  Mortgage Corporat ion (“FH LMC”), and by
nea r ly all oth er la rge-sca le seconda ry m ar ket  inves tor s, wit h
resp ect to loans th ey pur chase or secur itize.
Even  in the absence of a standar dized servicing agreem ent ,
modern  cour t s routinely find express auth ority from th e parties’
document s. For  example , in  T edesco v . B ekker,57 t he  se rvi ce r ’s
agreement  was “home-grown” and not st anda rd ized, bu t it
provided t h a t  th e servicer “was a ppointed a s exclusive agent t o
manage said loan for Lender” and th at  th e servicer was t o use
“a ll  rea sonable effort s to collect a ll fun ds du e un der t he t erm s
of sa id N ote a nd  Deed  of Tru st .”58 Despit e t he  some wh at  vagu e
ph ra seology of th e agree m e n t , t he court  was  sa tis fied th at  it
a u t h orized th e servicer to collect n ot only month ly insta llment
paymen t s but  th e mor tga gor’s fina l pa yoff as  well.59 The cour t
was un impr essed wit h t he a rgum ent  th at  th e l a n guage, wh ich
spoke of collect in g “al l fu nds  du e,” did  not  au thor ize  collect ion
of funds before th ey were du e.60
In  a  sim ilar  vein, in  S kott v. Bank  of America Illinois61 t he re
were  two indications of the a gent’s au th ority. First , the n ot e
itself r equired  paym ent s to be ma de to th e original mort gagee
“as ser vicing a gen t.”62 This phrase certainly suggests th a t  a
seconda ry marke t  t r ansfe r  was  an t icipa ted and  tha t  the
mor tgagee would become t he ser vicer for th e seconda ry ma rk et
in ves tor . Se cond,  the s econ da ry m arket  pu rchaser a dmit ted
tha t  he h ad a u thor ized t he m or tga gee  to se rvice  the loa n .63 The
cour t  noted t ha t “ther e was n o evidence of any limit a t ion  on
tha t  au thor i ty .”64
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65. Apparen t au thor i ty,  on  the  othe r  hand,  exis ts  where there is no express
au thor i ty at  all. Howeve r, t he cour ts often  disre gar d th is dis t i n ction and almost
ra ndom ly mix t he t erm s “implied ” and “app ar ent .”
66. 877 S.W .2d  237  (Mo. C t.  App . 19 94).
2. Im plied auth ority
 As noted a bove, imp lied a ut hor ity can  ar ise only when  the re
is first  some e xpr ess a ut hor ity; imp lied a ut hor ity is s im ply an
ext en sion  t o a cts  th at  wer e not  specifically me nt ioned in  th e
gran t of auth ority but ar e closely and reasonably conn ected
with  it. 65 St rict ly spea kin g, when  a  mor tgage  and note  a re
ass igned on the s econ d a ry mar ket , the m ortgagee’s implied
au thor i ty to collect payments can a rise on ly  when  the
mort gagee ha s been given express au thor i ty to do other  simila r
or  relat ed acts. Sever al exam ples come t o m i n d. If t he
mort gagee has  express  au thor i ty  to collect m onth ly insta llment
payments,  aut hority to collect a final payoff can be implied. If
t he mortgagee has express auth ority to collect payments of
interest, au th orit y to collect  pa ym en ts of p r in cipa l a s w ell  can
be implied. In ess ence, the  cour t s  hold tha t  the  pr incipa l cannot
exp ect  t h ird pa rt ies to split hair s an d to guess th at  one who is
au th orized to perform act A is unaut horized to per form  closely-
rela ted a ct B.
In  t heory, th e mort gagor might  dema nd t o see t he
mort gagee’s ser vicing agr eem ent  an d m ight  scru tin ize it
ca refu lly in order  t o det ect  any l imi t at ions  on  the  mor tgagee’s
au thor i ty to make collections. But life is simply too shor t  to
exp ect  mor tgagor s  t o s p en d  t his sor t of tim e a nd  ene rgy.
Examin ing th e servicing agreem ent  will be im poss ible if t he
mort gagee’s au thor i ty is  mere ly ora l. Mus t t he  mor tga gor
tele ph one or wr ite  to t he  as sign ee t o verify t ha t  t he m ortgagee
has the  necessa ry  au thor ity a nd th at  it ha s not been  modified
s ince the  la s t  t ime the  mor tgagor  made a  payment? Must  such
an  inquir y be mad e repea tedly before ever y paymen t  t o ensu re
tha t  no change in  the agent ’s au th ority ha s been m ade sin ce the
last  inquiry? Such propos a ls  a re a bs urd,  of course . F rom the
viewpoint of the mortgagor, payments ar e payments.
This  point is well illustr at ed in  United Missouri Bank v.
Beard .66 Ther e, the a ssigning m ortgagee wa s adm itted ly given
express auth ority to collect regular monthly payments of
pr incipa l an d int eres t  from the  mor tgagor ; the  is sue was
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67. S ee id . at 239-40.
68. S ee id . at  242 (citin g Hochr ein v. Ba lth asa r, 361  S.W.2d 31 5 (Mo. Ct.  App.
196 2)); Ha milt on v. H echt , 283 S.W.2d  894 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955). For a  th orough
review of the ea rlier cases, see Ulen v. Knecttle, 58 P.2d 44 6 (Wyo. 1936). A simila rly
ar chaic  lin e of cas es h old s  t h a t  a uth ority t o collect in ter est d oes not in clude a ut horit y
to collect pr incipa l. S ee, e.g., Koen v. Miller, 150 S.W. 411, 412 (Ar k . 1912); Hagen
v. Silva, 293 P.2d 143 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Steadm an v. Fost er, 92 A. 353, 354
(N.J . 191 4); T ilt on  v. B ola nd , 31  P. 2d  657 , 66 0 (Or . 19 34).
69. United Missour i Bank, 877 S.W.2d at 243.
70. Id .
whet her  that  auth ority extended to th e collection of a fina l
pa yoff of the  loan ,  an au thor i ty tha t  had  not  been  gr an ted
expr ess ly.67 The court wa s faced with old case au thor i ty s t a t ing
th at  th e power to collect ins ta llment s did not in clude th e power
to receive a full paymen t of the bala nce.68 The cour t  qu it e
pr operly  re jected  th is view a s “th e vest ige of a pr ior t ime .”69 It
obs er ved  tha t  since t he n ote pe rmit t ed  pr ep aym en t  wit hout  the
holde r ’s consen t, t he a ssign ee could ha rdly be disad vant aged
economically by the  mor tgagee’s  accept ing a  payoff.  Bu t  the
court ’s coup d e gra ce was t he following commen t:
Fin al ly , t h e p r i n ci p a l a l w a ys  h a s  t h e  a b il it y , i n d ee d  t h e  d u t y,
t o ch eck  on  t h e  d oin g s of h is  a ge n t  wit h ou t  r eg a r d t o w h e th e r
t h e no te  the  a gen t  i s  t o  col l ect  con ta ins  a  p r epaym en t  c l ause .
T h e exist en ce of su ch a  clau se in  no w ay  dep rive s t he  pr incip al
of t h e  o p p or t u n i t y  a n d  r e s p on s ibili ty  to k ee p t ra ck of s u ch
ma t t e r s . 70
The message of th e Beard  case is clear: it is th e assign ee’s
res pons ibility  to in form the  mor tgagor  of un expected nu an ces in
the agen t’s a ut hor ity. In t he  abs en ce of such n otice, t he
mort gagee’s fu l l au thor i ty as  a  serv icing a ge n t  t o collect a ll
sor t s of pa ym en ts ou gh t  to be  recogn ized.  Technica l d is t in ct ion s
between  ins ta llme n t  an d final pa yment s, or between
inst a llmen t s of p r incipa l  and  those of i nt e res t  only, sim ply
must  be  disr ega rde d; on e ca nnot  exp ect  the borrower to guess
tha t  such  va r ia t ions  ex is t .
3. Apparent authority
 Ap p a r en t  au th orit y ar ises w hen  th ere  is a n or al or  wr it t en
ma nifest at ion ma de by t he p rin cipa l  t o a  th i rd pa r ty,  crea t ing
the app ea rance t ha t  the a gen t  is  au thor ized t o act  on b eh a lf of
the p r incipa l . In  the cont ext of mort gage paymen t, two
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71. 468 S.E .2d  359  (Ga . 19 96).
72. S ee supra  Pa r t  III.C.1. T he  mor tga gor  ha d m ad e m ont hly  pa ym en ts  to t he
mortgagee  for  more than  a  yea r  a ft e r  t he a s s ignmen t  occu rr ed. See Skott ,  468 S.E.2d
a t  360.
73. S ee Skott , 468 S.E.2d at 361.
74. Id . (quoting Commer cial Credit Corp. v. Noles, 69 S.E.2d 309 (Ga. 1952)
(al t er a t ions in  or igin al )).
75. 476 P. 2d  883  (Ari z. C t.  App . 19 70).
s itua t ions often  arise in  which  the  mor tgagor  can  a rgue
persuasively t ha t  the  mor tgagee has  apparen t  au thor i ty.  One
such  case is when  the mortgagee and the assignee establish a
pa t t ern  of condu ct  un der  which th e mort gagee receives
insta l lment payments an d forwards t hem to the ass ignee. The
mor tgagor  is typically una war e t h a t  an  ass ignment  has
occurr ed or  t ha t  t he paymen t s ar e being  remi t t ed  to the
ass ignee; t he principal’s existen ce is undisclosed. Nonetheless,
the mortgagor receives no not ice  of defau l t  and reasonab ly
ass um es tha t  the p aym en ts a re bein g m ade  to t h e  pr oper
person . It is easy to find appar ent au thority on these facts,
a r i sing from the  pr incipa l ’s  inact ion  in  fa i ling to cor rect  the
mort gagor’s impr ession th at  th e mort gagee is th e proper  payee.
Thes e were p recise ly th e facts  in S kott v. Bank  of America
Illinois.71 In  ad dit ion t o findin g expr ess  au th orit y,72 th e court  in
an  alternat ive holding found tha t  t h e mor tgagee had  apparen t
au thor i ty to rece ive  the m or tga gor ’s pa yoff.73 Quoting a n ea rlier
Georgia case, the court  held that
w h e r e a  p r in ci pa l h a s  “p l a ce d  a n  a g e n t  in  s u c h  a  s it u a t i on  t h a t
a  pe r son  o f  ord ina ry  p ru dence  conve r sa n t  w i th  bus iness
usages  a n d  the  n a tu re  o f th at  pa rt icula r b us ine ss is  jus tified  in
a s su m i n g th at  su ch a gen t h as  au th orit y t o pe rfor m  a
p a r t icu l a r a ct  a n d  d ea ls  w it h  t h e  a ge n t  u p on  t h a t
a s su m p tion , . . . [a  p r in c ip a l] w il l n o t b e  pe r m it t e d t o p r ov e
t h a t  th e a gen t’s au th orit y wa s, in  f ac t , l e s s e xt e n si ve  t h a n  t h a t
wit h  wh ich  h e a pp ar en tly  wa s clot h ed .”74
This  is  an  ea sy  case . Som ewhat  more d ifficult  ar e case s in
which  no ins t a llmen t  paymen t s a re due, so tha t  t here  is  pat t e rn
of collection th at  can lead t he m ortgagor t o believe tha t t he
mort gagee is th e prope r  recip ien t  of the p aym en ts.  For
examp le, Holsclaw v.  Catal ina S av in gs &  Loan  Ass’n 75 involved
a  six-m onth  note w hich  req uir ed only a  sin gle pa ymen t of all
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76. The mor tga gee  as sign ed t he  not e a nd  mor tg age to a secondary ma rket
inv est or  but  ret ain ed poss ession  of the n ote. See id.  at 88 5 . T h is  in  itself sh ould h ave
been en ough  to con vince the  cour t  tha t  the payment  ru le  was  inappl icable  and tha t
the mortgagors’ payment to th e mortgagee was good; th e sym bolic writin g was in  th e
hands  of th e  p er s on  w h o was paid. The court, for no apparent  reason, refused to
accept this view.  See id.  at 887.
77. The facts recited by  t h e c ou r t  give no hin t of any gr an t of expres s au th ority
what ever to t he  mor tga gee . He nce , th e cou rt’s  charac ter iza t ion  of the  au thor i ty as
“implied” is t ech ni cal ly in corr ect .
78. S ee Holsclaw ,  476 P.2d at 885. The weakness in the court’s an a lys is  is  t he
ab se nce  of any evidence that t he mortgagors in  the instant  case had the slightest
kn owledge of the m ortgagee’s past pa tter n of dealing with the as signees. C lea r ly , t he
cour t  knew where it wan ted to go and was not inclined to l et  t echn ica l it i es  ba r  it s
pa th .
79. 491 N. W.2 d 2 78 (M ich . Ct . App . 19 92).
80. Once aga in ,  t he a r g u men t is  mor e pr oper ly on e for  ap pa re nt  th an  for
implied auth ority; the court r ecited no evidence of any express  agen cy relat ionsh ip
a t  all between th e assignee an d the m ortgagee.
81. 491 N.W.2d at 280.
pr incipa l an d int erest  at  th e end of the t erm .76 The cour t  found
an  “implied” (more a ccur at ely, “app ar ent ”77) agen cy fr om the
lon g and  r epea ted course of dealing between  th ese sam e
ass ignees and  the mor tgagee under  wh ich  the  mor tgagee had
accepted payments on other mortgages for the assigne es , had
run  the  funds  th rough  it s  accoun t s , a n d had  then  pa id  the
assignees. These  opera t ions  had  been  ca r r ied out  rep eat edly
with  respect to many mortgages wit hou t  ob ject ion  by the
assignees.78
Supp ose, however , t her e is  no h is tory of collect ion  of
paymen t s by th e mor tga gee on beh alf of this  pa rt icula r
ass ignee. Can  appa ren t  au thor i ty be found  from the
mort gagee’s simila r  act ion s on  beh a lf of other assign ees? In
Meret ta  v.  Peach ,79 t he  mor tgagor ,  Peach ,  was  ins t ructed to
make paymen ts t o Diam ond Mort gage Co., which was
au th orized to ser vice the  loan  for  the  or igina l mortgagee and for
th ree  affiliat ed compa nies  to wh ich t he loa n wa s su ccessively
assigned. When t he las t of those compa nies  ass ign ed  the loa n  to
Mere t t a , a n  ind epen den t in vest or wh o ha d n o affiliation  with
the mor tgagee, Peach  a rgued  tha t  Diamond’s  con t inu ing
au t h or ity  to receive paymen ts could be implied 80 from the
“usua l practice in the mortgage indust r y for ser vicing
companies to accept prepayment s”81 and  tha t  th is  p ract i ce  was
a  part  of “the general custom, usage and procedures in  t ha t
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82. Id .
83. S ee i d . This la st r equir emen t see ms a  bit ext rem e. Why sh ould t he
mor tgagor ’s righ t t o continu e payin g th e or igin al s er vicer  dep en d on  th e le vel of
soph ist icat ion  of the a ssignee? Is it not more sen sible to say th at a n invest or who
buys  a m ortga ge on th e seconda ry m ar ket  mu st a ssu me t he m ortga gor will contin ue
to mak e payment s in the s ame m ann er as before the a ssignmen t  i f n o  n ot ice to
change is gi ven  to t he  mor tga gor ?
84. 154 N. W. 6 45 (W is.  191 5).
85. S ee id . a t 646. The court might  have resolved the case by use of the implied
au thor i ty ar gu me nt  dis cus sed  ea rl ier : th at  th e m ort gag or c a n not  be  expected to make
fine distin ctions bet ween  th e au th ority t o receive one t ype of p aymen t  and  anothe r .
S ee supra Pa rt  III.C.2 . But  th e cour t did  not  emp loy th is ta ck. 
86. Weigell, 154 N.W. at 647 (quotin g WIS . STAT . § 202 4—77 k,  su bd . 7 (1 913 )).
bu sin ess .”82 The cour t  agreed tha t  th i s a rgument  was at  least
su ffi cien t  to su rvive  a  summ ar y judgm ent  mot ion, alt hou gh it
held  that  the ar gument could succeed only if Mere t t a , the
as sign ee, h ad  kn owledge  of the busines s p ract ice an d cus tom  in
ques t ion .83
Another  ver sion  of th is  “mor tga ge indu st ry cu st om”
arg um e nt  is found  in Weigell v . Gregg.84 Ther e, the m ortgagee,
a  tr ust  compa ny, tr an sferred  t he  note  tha t  r epresented  the
righ t  to pa ymen t of pr incipa l, but  a s et of coupons r epr esen tin g
the r igh t  to in teres t  payments  was left with  th e mortga gee, who
collected  th e inter est on a  rout ine bas is. H owever , th e
mor tgagor  made severa l principal pa yment s to th e mort gagee
as well—paym ent s which t he a ssignee a rgued  th e mort gagee
was not  au th orized t o accept a nd  did n ot bin d th e a ssignee.85
The cour t  placed  conside rable  reli ance on the Wisconsin stat ute
giving t rust  compa nies  br oad p owers t o “‘act  a s  agen t  or
at torn ey for th e tran saction of business, . . . th e collection of . . .
m ortgages, bonds , bills, not es, a nd  oth er s ecur itie s or
mon eys.’”86 The court observed:
T h e cus tom  of dea ling  wit h  tr u st  com pa n ies  on  th e a ss u m pt ion
t h a t  t h e y p os se ss  p le n a ry  a u t h or ity t o do th e t hin gs t he y h old
th em selv e s  o u t  as  ha vin g a ut hor ity t o do is s o gen er al t ha t
inca lcula ble  ha r dsh ips  w ould  en su e if t h eir  a u th or ity  to a ct
h a d  to b e e st a blis h ed  by t h e s a m e s tr ict  r ule s t ha t obt ain  in
t h e cas e of a n  in div idu al  act in g a s a n  ag en t. W h e r e t o t h e
kn owledge  of a  pr in cipal  th ey ass um e ful l  char ge  o f a  bus iness
m a t t e r , he  m us t  be  held t o  have  cons tit u te d t h em  h is a gen t for
t h a t  pu rpose,  even  th ough  th ey m ay exceed e xpre ss  au th ori ty ,
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87. Id .
88. 416 N. W.2 d 5 66 (N eb.  198 7).
89. S ee id. at 568.
90. S ee id .
91. S ee id .
92. Id . at 569 (quoting 3 AM . J U R . 2d Agency § 341 (1 986)); see also Chesi r e
Providen t In st . v. F ue sn er , 88  N. W. 8 49 (N eb.  190 2).
93. 697 P. 2d  100 9 (Wa sh . Ct . App . 19 85).
so lon g a s t h eir  a cti on  is fa ir ly g er m a n e t o t h e s u bje ct-m a tt er
en t r us t ed  t o  the i r  ha nds . 87
This  sta tem ent  sur ely gives tr ust  compa nies m ore th an  th eir
due. All commer cial mortgage lend ers  a re in precisely the same
pos it ion , and  the court ’s reasoning can plausibly be extended to
reach  th e conclusion th at  ever y commer cial mortgagee h as
apparen t  au thor it y t o collect  p a yments for assignees whose
exi st en ce is  undisclose d t o the m or tga gor .
This wa s precisely the p osition tak en by the Supreme Cour t
of Nebraska  in  Departm ent of Bankin g & Finance v. Davis,88 in
which  th e ass ign ee  pe rmit t ed  the or igina l m or tga gee  to collect
month ly paymen t s over  a  protr acted  period without any express
se rvicing agreemen t .89 When  the mor tgagor  re financed the  loan
and th e rema ining balan ce was pa id to the  mor tgagee,  the
mort gagee became ins olvent  an d failed  to r emit  the  funds  to the
ass ignee.90 The mor tgagor  had neve r  bee n  not ified of t he
ass ignee’s existen ce.91 The court held:
As  a  g e n er al  ru le, on e w h o cont ra cts  wit h  th e a gen t of  a n
un d i sc losed pr in cipal ,  supp osing t h a t  t h e  a ge n t  is  t h e r e a l
p a r t y  in  in te re st , a n d  n ot  be in g ch a r ge a ble  wi th  n ot ice of t h e
exi st en ce  of th e  p r i n c ip a l , i s  en t i t l e d , i f s u e d  b y  t h e  p r in c ip a l
on  t h e  con t r ac t ,  t o  s e t  up  any  de fenses  a nd  equ i t i e s  wh ich  h e
could  have  se t  u p  aga ins t  t he  a gen t  h ad  th e  l a t t e r  bee n  in
r e a l it y th e p rin cipa l su in g on  h is ow n  beh al f. Var iou s r ea son s
h a v e bee n  as sign ed  for t h is r u le, s u ch a s t h e es top pe l of t h e
u n dis close d p rin cipa l. . . .92
This i s r e m a rkably  close t o a  per se ru le: if the m ort gagor is
given n o not ice of th e as sign men t, t he m ort gagee is
au toma tically regar ded as  th e assign ee’s agen t.
Much  the  same approach  was  ad opted  in  R odgers  v.  S eat tl e-
First N ationa l Bank.93 Ther e, the m ortgagee h ad m ade a
collater al  assign men t  of the n ote a nd m or tga ge in  qu es t ion  as
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94. S ee id . at 1110.
95. S ee id .
96. S ee id .
97. S ee id . at 1012.
98. S ee id .
99. Id . at 1012 n .4. (quotin g GEORGE  OSBO RNE  ET AL ., REAL E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW
350 (197 9)).
100. Severa l of those who sen t writt en  comment s  t o t he  r epor t er s  on  the
ten ta tive  d ra ft  o f Restatement (Th ird) of Property (Mortgages) §  5.5 sugges t ed tha t  t he
law of agency was  indee d un iformly i n  agreement  with  these  cases , and  hence  tha t
the payment  ru le  was  not  a  p rob lem and  tha t § 5.5 was  un neces sar y. S ee, e.g., Letter
from  Fr ed H . Mill er , Pr ofess or, T he  Un iver sit y of Okla hom a, t o  Da le A . Whitman ,
P ro fes so r , Brigh am  Young Un iversit y Law S chool (J u l y  30, 1 996 ) (on fi le w it h a ut ho r).
He states:
Admitt edly, the last  point in the m emo (who to pay) is troublesom e
secu r ity for a  line of credit a dvan ced by the assigne e, a
commer cial bank.94 The assignee had never collected any
payments; indeed, since the loan in qu estion was  a  cons t ruct ion
loa n , it is  likely t ha t  no regular  paym ent s were du e. Neither
pa r ty gave the  mor tgagor  any not i ce  of t he  a ss ignmen t .95 When
the  mor tgagor  refinan ced the loan, the new lender remitted th e
ba lance due to t he m or tga gee , wh ich  fa ile d t o forwa rd i t  to the
ass ignee.96
The court  found th e payment binding on  two grounds . The
first  was  a  very  th in  case of estoppel. 97 The court n oted
tes t imony of the as sign ee’s em ployee a t t ria l th at , if t he  clos ing
agen t  had a sked t he a ssignee, th e latt er would h ave inst ru cted
the closing a gen t t o pay t he  mor tga gee dir ectly. 98 However , no
such  quest ion was ever a sked  in  fact n or an y such an swer
given. It  is a  litt le difficult  to see how an estoppel can arise
from a  s ta tement  tha t  was  never  made!
The cour t ’s  a lt e r nat ive th eory, a gency, is far  mor e pla us ible
a n d is complet ely consisten t with  th e other  “app ar en t
au thor i ty” holdings described a bove. The cou r t  quote s w ith
approva l the writings of t he  me(correct?) and Professor  Gran t
Nelson : “‘The agency rela t ionsh ip is t oo typical, t oo widely
expected, an d too consisten t with  busin ess pr actices to be
denied  by t he a ss ign ee  wh o has n ot  t aken  the  t roub le  to send
an  ap pr opria te  not ice to n ega te it. Absen t s uch  a n otice, it
sh ould b e pr esu me d.’”99
If a ll cou r t s w er e will in g t o t ake th e view found  in t he
Weigell, Davis ,  and Rodgers cases  just  discu ssed , th is a rt icle
could end h ere. 100 Unfor tunate ly, th at  is not t he case. Ot her
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th eoret ically, but it  has n ot been pr actically (no doubt  d u e to agen cy,
estopp el, and the like, including overriding consum e r  s ta t u t e s i n  so m e
states). And, of course, it would n ot  appea r  t he  Res t a t emen t , absen t
s t a tu tory codification, could override Art icle 3.
Professor  Ja mes S. Rogers expr essed mu ch the s ame idea  durin g the floor debate  on
§ 5.5 at the an nual m eeting of the America Law Institu te. He said,
[I]t  seem s to m e th at  you ma y well be able  to sa y a  g r ea t  d ea l  m ore  abou t
t h e im pa ct of t he  age ncy r ule s h er e in  th at , if we’ve got  a h old e r  of  th e
mort gage  wh o ha s n ot  c a us e d t h e mor tgage  to be  ass igned  on  the  rea l
e s t a t e records or, for example, has accepted paymen t s  from the maker ,
couldn’t  t hose  act s  t hemselves suffice under appar ent agency doctrines to
ser ve as an est oppel of a content ion that t hat per son has not au thorized the
per son  who ha s re ta ine d  t h e position a s re corded m ortga gee to r eceive
paymen t s on  beh al f of.
Ja mes  S. Roger s, Annua l Meet ing Floor Debate, 73 A.L.I. P ROC . 37 (1996 ). Pr ofess or
Rogers’s refer ence t o the  fact th at  th e mor tga ge ass ignm ent  ma y be u nr ecor ded  is n ot
ap t , for  i t  is  cl ea r  t ha t  t he  mor tgagor  has,  in  most  j ur i sd ic t io n s, no ob liga tion  to
examine th e re cords be fore m ak ing pa ymen ts. S ee NELSON  & WH I T M AN , s u pra no te
8, § 5.34. But his su ggestion that  the a cceptance of paymen ts by the a ssignee  may
cons t it u t e appa ren t  au thor i ty in  t he mor tgagee  is  en t ir ely consisten t with t he cases
discussed. S ee supra  Par t III.C.3. My re sp ons e t o hi m w as , “Obvi ous ly, w e ve ry  mu ch
agree  with  whe re you  ar e going on  th is.” Dale A. Whit ma n, Annua l Meet ing Floor
Debate, 73 A.L.I. P ROC . 37 (199 6).
101. S ee Hagen  v. Silva, 293 P.2d 143, 146 (Cal. Dist. Ct.  App . 19 56) (“[A]ut horit y
to collect  interest does not establish agency to collect principal, nor does it  give rise
to an  estopp el” (citing Sch omak er v.  Pete rsen , 285 P . 34 2 (Ca l. D ist . Ct . App . 19 30)));
S teadman v. Foster, 92 A. 353, 354 (N.J. 1914) (holding tha t no estoppel existed
b e ca u se the m ortgagor was not led to chan ge its position by any act of the a ssignee);
Leona rd v. L eon ia  He igh ts  La nd  Co.,  87 A.  645  (N. J . 19 13);  Tilton v. Boland, 31 P.2d
657, 661-62 (Or. 1934 ) (hold ing  th at  th er e wa s n o su ppor t for  th e m ort gag or’s
as ser tion  th at  th e circum sta nces oper at ed to es top t he a ssigne e from a sser tin g th at
the mort gagee la cked a ut horit y to receive p aym ent  of principa l on th e not e); Ulen v.
Knecttle, 58 P.2d 446, 455 (Wyo. 1936) (notin g t ha t n o im plie d or  ap pa re nt  ag en cy
existed despite a long patt ern of mortgagee collecting paymen ts on beha lf of t h e  sa m e
assignee  on  oth er  loa ns ).
102. S ee, e.g., In re Colum bia P ac. Mort g., Inc., 22 B .R. 753, 755-56 (Bankr . W.D.
Wash. 1982); Ruck er v. S ta te E xch. Ba nk , 355 So. 2d 1 71,  174  (Fl a. Dist. Ct. App.
197 8); Culbe rt son S ta te Ba nk  v. Dah l, 617 P .2d 1295, 1 297 (Mont. 1980); Lam bert  v.
Barker , 348  S.E .2d  214 , 21 7 (Va . 19 86) (“[I]t  wa s t he  [mo rt ga gor s’] res pons ib il it y  t o
raise an d est ablis h t his a ffirma tive d efens e. Th e [mor tga gors], h owever , never
assert ed paymen t to [the a ssignee]; no r d id t he y a lle ge t ha t p ay me nt  to [t he
mortgagee] cons ti tu te d p ay me nt  to [t he  as sig ne e] u nd er  an  act ual or implied  ag en cy
th eory.” (cit at ion  om it te d)).
cour t s ha ve disregar ded or flatly rejected ar gumen ts  b a sed on
implied or  apparen t  au thor i ty and  on  appa ren t  author i ty ’s
v ir tua l twin , est oppel.101 In  some cases, th e cour ts h ave failed
even to cons ider  the exis t en ce of a n  a g en cy relationship,
perhaps  becau se it  wa s n ot compe te nt ly ar gue d by t he
mor tgagor ’s counse l.102 In  other  cases, cour ts  ha ve sim ply
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103. S ee Nat ional Cre dit Un ion Admin. Bd. v. Metzler, 625 F. Supp. 1551, 1553
(E. D. Mo. 1 986 ); see als o Hagen  v. Silva, 293 P.2d 143 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956)
(holding  tha t  no au thorit y of mor tga gee  to colle ct p ri ncip al p aym en ts  can  be fou nd
desp it e evi de nce  th at  (1) not e was payable at  mortgagee’s office, (2) assignee had
designated  mor tgagee as  agent  in  other similar  tra nsactions, and (3) mortgagee ha d
poss ess ion  of th e n ote ).
104. S ee La mb er t v.  Ba rk er , 348  S.E .2d 2 14, 2 16 (Va . 198 6); see gen erally
Nat iona l Cred it Un ion Ad mi n.  Bd.  v. M et zle r,  625  F.  Su pp . 15 51 (E .D.  Mo. 1 986 );
Hagen  v. S ilva , 29 3 P .2d  143  (Ca l. D ist . Ct . App . 19 56).
105. 98 N. E.  457  (N. Y. 19 12).
106. S ee id . at  461 (“We do not desir e to be r egar ded a s holdin g th at  th e ru le
applied in th is case to a final pa yment  would necessar ily be applicable to a  par tia l
p a ym e n t of pr in cipa l or  a p ay me nt  of in te re st , a nd  th at  th e pa yer  in  su ch l at te r ca ses
would  always be under obligation to call for the prod u ct ion  of the  bond .  Whi le  tha t
q u e st ion  is not  her e for decision, it is  appa ren t t ha t qu ite differen t r eason ing migh t
be applie d to th e case of full an d final p aym ent  an d to th at  of one which wa s only
par t i a l an d d id n ot e nt it le t he  pa yer  to s ur re nd er  of th e in st ru me nt s.”).
107. S ee Wei gel l v. G re gg, 1 54 N .W. 6 45,  646 -47 (W is.  191 5).
108. S ee Brayley v. Ellis, 32 N.W. 254, 255 (Iowa 1887); Steadma n v. Foster , 92
A. 353, 354 (N.J. 1914); Foster  v. Beals, 21 N.Y. 247, 252 (1860); Tilton v. Boland,
31 P. 2d  657 , 66 0 (Or . 19 34).
109. U.C.C. § 3-60 2(a ) (199 0) (em ph as is a dd ed ).
dismiss ed th e i de a  on  the  ground  tha t  the mor tgagor  has  not
proven an a gency relationship.103
A fu r the r factor  tha t  makes  agen cy a  weak reed for
mor tgagor s to re ly  upon  i s the  fact  tha t  the  burden  of pr oof of
agency is  nea r ly a lways  sa id  to be  on the  mor tgagor .104 Whether
overcomin g th at  bur den  is ea sy or difficult  var ies wit h t he
cour t , as t he d iscuss ion  above  su ggest s.  Non et hele ss , t he fa ct
tha t  th e mort gagor ha s th e bu rden  pla inly m ak es su ccess in
proving agency less certa in th an  it would other wise be.
4. Installment paym ents
 W h et h e r th e paym ent  ru le applies t o non-final pa yment s is
disputed. The widely-cited opin ion  in  Assets Realization Co. v.
Clark 105 expressly limits th e payment rule to final payments,106
pre s um ably  on  the  ground  tha t  it  i s not  negl igen t  for  the  payor
to fail to demand pr oduct ion  of the  note  be fore  making  each
regula r  insta l lment  payment .107 However , sever al cas es a pply
the payment ru le to non-final payments. 108 Und er t he cur ren t
la n g u a ge of Article 3, it  is clear that  the payment r ule applies
to inst allmen t a s well a s fina l paymen ts, sin ce section 3-602
provides tha t  a n  i nstru ment is paid “to the extent pa ymen t is
ma de . . . t o a pe rs on en tit led t o enforce t he  ins tr um en t.”109
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110. S ee, e.g., In  re Columbia Pac. Mortg.,  Inc.,  22 B.R. 753 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
198 2); Cu lbe rt son  St at e Ba nk  v. D ah l, 6 17 P .2d  129 5, 1 296  (Mon t.  198 0).
111. 697 P. 2d  100 9 (Wa sh . Ct . App . 19 85).
112. Id . at 1010. Ba sed on t he se  fact s, t he  cour t fou nd  th at  an  ag en cy
rela tions hip  exist ed. See id . at 1012.
113. S ee, e.g., Nichols v. The Cadle Co., 139 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 1998). The holder
of th e m ort gag e in  th at  cas e a ssi gn ed i t a s colla te ra l to a  cre dit or b u t  co nt inued  to
se rv ice it a nd  collect  all  pa ym en ts . Up on t he  mor tg agor’s de fau lt,  th e a ssi gn or
foreclosed the  mor tgage .  The  mor tgagor  a rgued  tha t  this  foreclosu re  was  imprope r ,
sin ce Ma ssa chu set ts  law  re qu ir es t he  hold er  of a m ort gag e t o foreclose it in its own
nam e. However, the court h eld that t he assignee received “som eth ing l es s  t han  the
ord ina ry full  ‘own er sh ip’ of a mor tga ge,” a nd  th us  th at  th e a ssi gn or r etained a
su ff ic ien t int eres t in  th e mor tga ge to foreclose it.
114. S ee supra  no t e 104  and accompany ing  t ex t .
5. Outright v. collateral assignm ents
 Whether  the mor tgage an d n ote a re  bein g as sign ed ou tr ight
or  mer ely  pled ged  as col la ter a l for  som e ot her  obliga t ion  of th e
mort gagee to the a ss ign ee  is  theor et ica lly i r rele va nt ; the
payment ru le applies in both cases.110 However ,  when  a
collater al  assignment is made, it  is much  m or e  likely tha t  the
ass ignee exp ect s the a ss ign or  to cont in ue t o collect  the
paymen t s on  the u nd erlyin g mor tga ge debt , at  leas t u nt il th e
ass ign or  de fau lt s in  pa ym en t  to the a ss ign ee  on the obliga t ion
tha t  th e mor tga ge loan  collat era lizes. Th e facts  in R odgers v.
S eattle-First National Ban k 111 ar e illustr at ive:
[T h e a s s ignee ]  d id  no t  have  a  m ech a n i s m  t o r e ce iv e  p a ym e n t s
dir ectly  on  loa n s m a de  by  [th e a ss ign or ]; [th e a ss ign or ] a s t h e
a ct u a l ma ker  of t h e  l o a n s  r e c e iv e d  t h e  p a y m e n t s .  T h e
te st im on y d i sc losed  tha t  even  if [ t he  c los ing  agen t ]  had  ca l l ed
[t h e as sign ee’s] hea d br an ch, it  wou ld  h a v e  b e en  t o l d  t o p a y
[t h e  a s si gn o r ].112
Hen ce, in deter minin g whether  an  imp lied a gency r elat ionsh ip
exists  be tween  the a ss ign or  and t he a ss ign ee , cou rts  can  and
should t ake  in to account  the  fact  tha t  the  ass ignment  was as
collater al. 113 Tha t fa ct is  he lp fu l  t o t he  mor tgagor . St ill, th ere  is
no g u a r a nt ee  tha t  a  cour t  wil l do so,  give n  the fa ct  tha t  the
bu rde n  of pr oof of agen cy is  on  the p ayor .114
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6. S tatu tory help for m ortgagors
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115. 624 P. 2d  235  (Wyo.  198 1).
116. S ee id . at 238.
117. S ee U.C.C.C . § 3.201 (1974); U.C.C.C. § 3.406 (196 8);  WYO . STAT . AN N . § 40-
14-337 (Mich ie 1 997 ).
118. S ee U. C.C .C.  § 1.3 01(1 5) (19 74).
119. CO N N . GE N . STAT . § 42a -3-60 2, a s a me nd ed b y 19 98 C onn . Act s. 98-147 (Reg.
Se ss .).
120. S ee GA. CO D E  AN N . § 11-3-602(c) (1997); Skott  v. Ban k of America I lllinois,
468 S.E.2d 35 9, 361 (Ga. 1996) (Flet cher , P.J ., concurr ing) (ap p ly ing  the s t a tu t e t o
conclude that m ortgagors properly made payments to  m or t g a gee a bse nt  not ice fr om
assignee  tha t paymen ts should be ma de to assignee). The st atu te, ena cted in 1981,
appea r s to have been based on earlier cases such as N ort h side Bu i ld ing & Investmen t
Co. v. F in an ce Com pa ny  of A m erica , 166  S.E .2d  608 , 612  (Ga . Ct . App . 196 9), wh ich
t rea t the mortgagee as the assignee’s “secret agent” for collection purposes.
121. S ee MD . CO D E  AN N ., RE A L P ROP . § 7-10 3(b) (1 996 ).
122. A special comm itt ee on m ortga gor liab i li ty has  recommended  a  simila r
 In  a  few isolated cases m ortgagors h ave been a ble to a rgue
su ccessfully for r elief from th e paym ent  rule on the basis of
sta tu te.  For exam ple, in Young  v.  Hawks,115 t he p romissory  note
signed by the borrowers recited that it  was subject  to the
prov is ions of the U nifor m Con su mer  Cr ed it  Code (U .C.C .C.). 116
The U.C.C.C., wh ich is in  effect in only eleven sta tes, pr ovides
tha t  the d ebtor  is  au thor ized t o pa y t he or igina l lend er u nt il he
receives not ifica t ion  of as signmen t of rights t o paymen t
pursuan t  to a  consumer  loan  and th at payment  is to be made to
the assign ee.117 Th is  la ngu age w ould  app ly whet her  or  not  the
mor tgage note was n egotiable. However, becau se th e U.C.C.C.
has been adopted in so few jur isdictions, and becau se it a pplies
on ly to “cons um er  loan s,”118 it  offer s on ly a  ver y fr ag m en t a ry
respite to borrowers.
The Conn ecticu t, G eorgia , an d  Ma r ylan d legis lat ur es h ave
adopted  similar  langu age. Connect i cu t ’s  s t atu t e simply amends
UCC Article 3 to provide th at  payment  of an  inst rument  may be
made  “to the assign or  in the  case of a  mor tgage  debt  t ha t  is
ass igned without  sufficient  notice to the party obliged to pay.”119
The stat ute also provides det a i led  p rocedures for  g iv ing
“sufficien t  not ice .” Georg ia ’s stat ute also am ends U CC Article 3,
reve rs ing th e paym ent  ru le for a ll negotiable note s t ha t  a r e
pa yable  in ins t a llmen t s .120 Maryland’s st a tu t e  i s l imi t ed  to
notes  secured by m ortgages a nd a pplies only when t he
ass ignment  of th e mort gage ha s been r ecorded .121 No other
s t a t e seems t o h a v e ena cted a ny s imila r a men dm ent  to Art icle
3.122
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ W H I - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1169] THE P AYMENT RULE  PARADIGM 1195
s t a tu t e t o  the Conn ecticut  Law R evision  Comm ission . S ee R eport  of M ortg agor
Liabili ty Com m itt ee (J an . 9,  199 8) (on  file  wit h a ut ho r).
123. S ee N E L S O N  & WHIT MAN , supra  note 8, § 5.34; Rucker v. State  Exch. Bank ,
355 So. 2d 171, 174 (Fla . Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (“[A]s [the assignee] properly recorded
the assign ment of the mortgage from [the mortgagee], [the mort gagor] satisfied the
mort gage  at her peril because she was on constructive notice of [the assignee’s]
in te re st .”); Verle R. S eed, Mortgage “Payment” Statu tes in Kansas and N ew M exico ,
3 KAN . L. RE V. 87 (1 954 ).
124. Thus, the prevailing view is that r ecordation of the assignment provides no
notice  t o t h e  m ort gagor. S ee, e.g., Thomas v. Zah ka, 164 N.Y.S. 193, 197 (Sup. Ct.
1917) (“Constru ctive notice of the a ss ig n ment by mer ely recording it is not su fficient.
The deb tor  is n ot b oun d by i t.”); see generally Anno tat ion ,  Recording Laws as Applied
to Assignm ents of Mortgages on Real Estate,  89 A.L.R. 171, 19 3 (1934), su pp lem ent ed
by 104  A.L. R. 1 301  (193 6).
125. Kansas an d New J ers ey ar e th e prin cipal pr oponent s of this  view. S ee
Anthony v. Bre nn an , 87 P. 1 136 (Kan . 1906), (citing K AN . L. 1899, ch. 168 (now KAN .
STAT . AN N . § 58-2301)), cited with approval in  Bank  Wester n v. Hen derson, 874 P.2d
632, 637 (Kan . 1994); Army Na t’l Bank v. E quit y Developers, Inc., 774 P.2d 919, 927
(Ka n . 1989 ); Pl et che r v . Albr ech t, 3 50 P .2d 5 8, 62  (Kan . 196 0); see al so In  re Kennedy
Mortg.  Co., 17 B.R. 957, 965 (Bankr . D.N.J. 1982); Leonard v. Leonia Heights  Land
Co., 87 A. 645, 646-47 (N.J . 1913); Marling v. Milwauk ee Realty Co., 106 N.W. 844,
846 (Wis . 19 06) (h oldi ng  th at  th e a ss ign ee  is e st opp ed  by fa ilur e t o r eco rd;  paymen t
to mo rt ga gee  dis cha rg es  mo rt ga ge).
126. T h e cour t  got  i t  r igh t  in  Eq ui ty  Ba nk  v. G ons alv es, 691 A.2d 1143 , 1145
(Conn . Sup er. Ct . 1996), wh en it  sta ted , “The  owner  of the pr opert y  . .  . ha s  no
obliga tion  or even  occasion to check t he la nd r ecords for a n a ssignm e n t  of  a  mort gage
he ha s given . The  recor ding of th e as signm ent , th ere fore, is not  notice  to him .” As
Pr ofess or  Du rfe e pu t i t,  “We h av e s een  th at  [th e m ort ga gor ] is n ot ch ar ged wit h
notice  by record of the a ssignment , and in th e nam e of consistency he s h ou ld  not
ha ve th e ben efit of non -record .” E DGAR N. DU R F E E, I  CA S E S  ON  SECURIT Y 422 (195 1);
A th ird form of stat ut ory relief for  m ort gagors  ma y ar ise in
a  few st a tes  from cons t ruct ion  of t he ir  r ecord ing act s . In  nea r ly
a l l sta tes m ortgage a ssignm ent s ar e recordable, but  a few
sta tes  go far the r  and hold tha t  r ecorda t ion  of an  ass ignment
gives not i ce  of i t s exi st ence t o the m or tga gor .123 This  not ion
ma kes  little sense, for it  assum es tha t t he mortga gor will
exa m i n e the r ecor d t it le t o the r ea l es ta te befor e m akin g ea ch
and eve ry paym en t . In  rea lit y, t o exp ect  the m or tga gor  to do s o
would  be t o impose a n in tolerable burden, and th ere is no
genera l pra ct ice  of  mor t g a gor s  m a k in g  su ch  t i t l e
examina t ions .124 Nonetheless, th e not ion is  ingr ain ed in  th e law
of sever a l s t ates . It s cor olla ry is  tha t , in  the a bs en ce of
r ecorda t ion  of an  ass ignment ,  the mor tgagor  can  con t inue
sa fely to pa y th e origin al m or t gagee.125 This  is equ ally
non sen sical; i t  is  a  ru le  tha t benefi t s the  mor tgagor  when  the
ass ignee ha s failed to per form an  act  t ha t , from the  mor tgagor ’s
poin t of view, is en tir ely useless.126 Noneth eless, in a few
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accord  Ch as e v.  Com me rce  Tr us t C o., 2 24 P . 14 8 (Ok la . 19 24).
127. S ee U.C.C. § 9-31 8(3) (1 995 ) (“The a ccount d ebtor  is au th orized t o pay th e
as sign or  un t i l t he  accoun t  d e bt o r  re ceive s n otifica tion  th at  th e a mou nt  du e or  to
becom e due  has been  a s s igned  and  that  paymen t  is to b e m ad e t o th e a ssi gn ee.”); see
also Comm ercial S av. Ba nk  v. G & J  Wood Pr ods . Co.,  207  N.W .2d  401 , 404  (Mich .
C t . App . 19 73).
128. U.C.C. § 9-318 was impr operly applie d to a n ote secu red b y rea l esta te in
Kirby v. P alos  Verd es E scrow  Co., 227 Ca l. Rptr . 785, 787 (Ca l. Ct. App. 1 986), a  suit
by a borr ower a gain st a n escr ow compan y for payin g the  mor tg ag ee d es pit e t he  fact
tha t  th e n ote  ha d be en  as sign ed.  Th e cou rt  see ms  not  to h ave recognized the limited
scope of the section. However, it made n o difference in the outcome,  s ince the  cour t
held  th e escrow compa ny h ad n otice of the a ssignm ent  by vir t u e  of  th e f ac t  tha t  a
corres pondin g ass ignm ent  of the m ort gage h ad b een  recor ded, a n d beca us e a  copy of
a  title insu ran ce policy showing the r ecordation ha d been forwar ded to t he  escr ow
compan y. See id.  at 789-90.
ju r isdict ion s i t  may save  the mor tga g or’s bacon in the odd case
where the assignee fails to record.
The thr ee statut ory argument s just discussed are  mer ely of
pass ing inter est; I ha ve included th em only for t he sa ke of
completeness. None of th em h as su fficient ly widesprea d
ap plicat ion to be regarded as a  gen er a l solu t ion  to the
mort gagor’s dilemm a u nder  th e paym ent  ru le.
There is plen ty of pre ceden t in  a  va r iety of model sta tu tes
for  chang ing  the payment  ru le , bu t  they  offer lit t le p ract ica l
help  for  mor tga gor s. Both t he Uniform Lan d Transa ctions Act
and th e Uniform La nd Secur ity Int erest  Act r everse the
common la w r u le a nd a llow  the  mor tgagor  to pay th e mort gagee
un t il notice of the a ssignm ent  is given, but n either  has be en
adopt e d in a ny Amer ican jur isdiction. Article 9 of th e UCC
adop t s t he  same  approach  for  accoun t s an d for debt s secured  by
cha t t e l paper ,1 2 7  but  it can not  pr operly be  ap plied t o negotia ble
or non-negotiable instr ument s secured by mortgages.128
IV. TH E  CA SE  F O R  CH A N GI N G  TH E  P A YM E N T  RU L E
A. Why t he Paym ent Ru le No Longer Makes Comm ercial S ense
 It  ma y well once h ave  been t ru e th at  borrowers  rout inely
dema nded  to se e t heir  notes  before making final payments on
th eir  mortgage loans and conceivably may even h ave ma de th e
same demand  before  making inst allm en t p aym en ts . Today,
s u ch  a r equest  is almost  un th inka ble as a  pra ctical mat ter  a nd
would  be met  a t  m ost  len ding in st it u t ion s w it h  in cred ulit y or
an  imper ious explana tion th at  it is impossible for t he lend er t o
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honor  the request. Three factors ma ke t h i s so.  The  fi r st  i s the
br oad exp ansion  of br anch  ba nkin g. Most  fin ancia l in st it u t ion s
pr obably centr alize the s tora ge of th eir mort gage docum en ts  in
t h eir  ma in offices in  order  to m ain ta in bet ter  contr ol of t h e m.
But  th is mea ns t ha t a  borr ow er  who m ak es a  pa ymen t in
per son in  a  bra nch  office simp ly cann ot expect , with out  cau sin g
a  great deal of inconvenience, to have his or  he r  promissory
note produced.
The second fa ctor is t he gr owth  of payme nt  of notes by m ail,
and increas ingly by elect ron ic t r ans fe r . In  many cases , the
lender  is a ut hor ized t o dra w th e mon th ly paym ent s dir ectly
from th e borr ower’s ban k account, so th at  not even a  paper
check need be m ailed. Even wh en m ak ing a final pa yment , few
borrowers  wa lk  in to the lend er’s office to ten der  th eir  checks. In
these ci rcumstances , the  payor’s  d em a nd t o se e t he n ote befor e
pa ying is comp lete ly impr act ical.
The th i rd factor  i s the  enorm ou s  gr owth  of t he  seconda ry
ma rk et  in mort gages. The tw o principal federal ly -cha r t e red
seconda ry mar ket agencies, FNMA and FHLM C, rou tin ely
req uir e tha t  they r ece ive  and h old  pos se ss ion  of th e origin al
notes  on all loans t hey pu rcha se. Similar ly, if the loan becomes
pa r t of a pool of mortgage-backed secur ities, th e original notes
will be t ra ns ferr ed t o an  ind epen den t cu st odian  to be h eld u nt il
fina l paym ent is  received on them . In either case, the notes are
not  left wit h t he  origin al m ort gagee, even though  the or igina l
m or t gagee is usu ally designat ed as t heir “servicer.” Of course,
the “s er vicing” designa tion is beneficial to most borrowers,
s ince i t  means tha t  t hei r  cont inued  paym ent s to th e mort gagee
will count , bu t  it  has a lso cause d a  va st  change in  exp ect a t ion s
on th e par t of both  borr owers  an d len der s. No one s eriou sly
thinks th at  it is  feasib le today for t he original m ortgagee t o
d isp lay th e not e at  a m omen t’s n otice, whether  on  an
insta l lment pa ym en t  or  on  a  fin a l paym en t . Th e n ote is  more
lik ely  held  in  a  va u lt  in  Wa sh in gt on  or  Ne w Yor k.
For  th ese r eas ons—br an ch ba nk ing, m ail a nd  elect ron ic
paymen t , and  the g rowth  of the seconda ry m ar ket —th e pr act ice
of exhibiting th e note up on paym ent ,  t o t h e  exten t  tha t  it  once
existed, has  been  swept  away. Hence, no one a sks t o see the
note any  more , even  in cases in  which  the  mor tgagee has  no
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129. S ee In re Columbia Pac. Mortg.,  Inc.,  22 B.R. 753, 754 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1982) (“[I]t is the local [Portlan d, Oregon] custom of escrow companies, when  dealing
with  ins tit ut iona l len der s, t o close e scr ows w ith out  ha v in g the  or igina l loan
documents  in t he ir  poss ess ion.  Th is cu st om i s pr em ise d u pon  th e a ssu mp tion  th at
ins t itu t iona l len de rs  wil l for wa rd  th e d ocu me nt s u pon  re ceip t of t he  fun ds .”).
130. Profess iona l closing agents h ave made t he “mistake” of failing to demand
pr odu ction  of the n ote before ma king paymen t in severa l cases. S ee id . at 7 53 (title
in su rance compan y); Holsclaw v. Cat alina  Sav. & Lo a n  Ass’n, 476 P.2d 883 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1970) ( t it l e  insurance com pa ny ); Kirby v. P alos Verd es Es crow Co., 227 Cal.
Rp t r . 785 (Ct. App. 1986) (escrow company); Skott v. Bank  of Am. Ill., 468 S.E.2d 359
(Ga. 1996) (finance company); Mer e t ta v. Peach, 491 N.W.2d 278 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992) (feder al s avi ng s a nd  loan  as socia tion  re fina ncin g exi st ing  loan ); Un ite d Mo.
Bank v. Bear d, 877 S.W .2d 237 (Mo. Ct . App. 1994) (escrow company) ; Depa r tmen t
of Bankin g  a n d F i n . v. Davis, 416 N.W.2d 566 (Neb. 1987) (mortgage company
re financing existing loan); Taylor v. Roeder, 360 S.E.2d 191  (Va.  198 7) (a tt or ne y);
Amer ican  Se c. & T ru st  Co. v . J oh n J . J ul ia no , In c., 1 27 S .E .2d  348  (Va. 1962)
(at to rney) ; Rodgers v. Seatt le-First N at’l Bank, 697 P.2d 1009 (Wash. Ct . App. 1985)
( federa l savin gs an d loan a ssociation ). I assu me t ha t in  all of the se case s th e closing
agen t  wou ld h ave  bee n li ab le t o th e m ort gag or for  th e los s if t he  pa ym en t w er e fou nd
to ha ve be en  ne glige nt  an d in effect ive, a nd  he nce  th at  th e m ort gag or’s p os it i on  in  the
lit iga tion  was financed by the closing agent.
se rvicing agreemen t .129 The not ion  t h a t  it  is  negl igen t  for  the
borrower  to fa i l t o deman d  p r od u ct ion  of the n ote, e ven  on a
fina l pa ymen t, is s imply abs ur d. Up on r eceiving a  fina l
paymen t , a  len de r  wil l likely  in form th e pa yor th at  th e not e will
be marked “pa id” and  retu rned, a long with  a r ecorded
sa t is fact ion , in a few weeks. Even when the final payme n t  is
made  by an a tt orney or an  escrow agent , bot h  of whom should
pr esu ma bly un der st an d t he r ules  govern ing su ch m at ter s, it is
extr eme ly r a re  for  t hem to demand a dvance exhibi t ion  of th e
note. In  re cent  year s, in  fact , mos t  of those  “burned” by the
payment ru le ha ve been  pr ofessiona l closing a gen t s,  not
individual borrowers.130
B. Th e Practical Hardsh ips Im posed by the Paym ent Ru le
 Desp ite  th e pa ymen t r ule’s poten tia l for  caus ing  damage to
innocent  mortgagors (and to their lawyers and escr ow
compa nies ), cases  tha t  actua l ly  resu lt  in  such  damage  a re
rela tively  ra re. T h e p r incipal reason is the well-nigh universal
pra ctice, wh en  a  mor tga ge n ote is  sold ou t r igh t  on  the
commer cial seconda ry m ar ket  or is se cur itized , of design at ing
the original mort gagee as “ser vice r” with  fu l l au thor i ty and
du ty to colle ct  paymen ts on beh alf of th e seconda ry ma rk et
in ves tor  or  t he  pu rchaser s  of the securitized pool inter ests . The
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131. S ee 12 U .S. C. § 2 605 (c)(1) (19 94).
132. S ee, e.g., Groover v. Peter s, 202 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. 1973); Stegeman v. First
Mo. Ban k, 722 S.W.2d  349 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding t ha t a  mort gagor  who was
notified that h er note had been assigned, but not told that sh e shou l d m a k e  h er
paymen t s to th e ass ignee, wa s forced to pa y a second  tim e to th e ass ignee, de spite
the fact th at  she d ut ifully ma de he r pa yoff to th e origina l mort gagee (a local real
e s t a t e br oke ra ge com pa ny )).
FNMA an d t he  FH LMC, t he  tw o lar gest  second ar y ma rket
purchaser s of mor tga ges , r out in ely  do s o, a s d o other  major
seconda ry ma rk et  pu rch as er s. Mor eover, if t he  ser vicing r ight s
a re later  reas signed to a different  agent , federa l law requires
tha t  both  th e old an d n ew ser vicer n otify th e borrower.131
Hen ce, the com mer cia l secon da ry m arket  sa le or  se cur it iza t ion
of a borr ower’s m ort gage is  simply a n on-event to th e borrower,
who will continue to make payments t o the original m ortgagee
unless and un til he or sh e receives not i ce  of a  t r ans fe r  of
ser vicing.
A further rea son that loss to the mortgagor is rar e in
commer cial seconda ry ma rk et  sa les is  t ha t  mos t  mor tgagees  a re
solvent fina ncia l ins tit ut ions. I f th ey re ceive a p aym ent  tha t
shou ld ha ve gone t o an a ssignee, th ey have both  th e hon es ty
and the  necessa ry a s set s  t o r ei m bu r se t he  as sign ee. Obviou sly,
unjust  en r ichmen t  will result if the mortgagee is permitted to
keep the payment to which it was not entitled.
When  is th e paym ent  ru le a pr oblem? The an swer  is
when ever the in solven cy of th e mor tga gee is combin ed wit h  the
absence of an expr ess agen cy relationsh ip between  th e
mort gagee and t he a ss ign ee . Of cou r se, any m ortgage lend er
may become in solven t . Bu t  two d anger ous sit ua t ions  a re
apparen t . The fir st  is  a  loa n  from a n on-institu tional m ortgagee
(comm only a former owner of the rea l estat e who has sold it  to
the p resent  mor tgagor  and  has  t aken  back  a  purchase-m oney
mort gage). Such a  mort gagee ma y sell the pa per t o a n oth er
ind ividua l, or  to a  financia l inst i tu t ion ,  bu t  i n e ithe r  ca se the re
is no r egu lar ized p rocedu re  th at  des igna te s t he  mor tga gee a s
the ass ignee’s  agen t .1 3 2  Moreover , it is  ent ire ly possib le, an d
perhaps  likely, that  th e individual mort gagee who
un scru pu lously collects p aymen ts  an d fails to rem it th em to the
ass ignee will be ins olvent  whe n ca lle d t o account  for  the
missing funds.
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133. S ee, e.g., In re Colum bia P ac. Mortg., Inc., 22 B.R. 753 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
198 2).  
134. RE S T AT E M E N T (THIRD ) O F  P ROP ER TY (MO R TG A GE S) § 5.5 (T en ta tiv e Dr aft  No.
5, 199 6).
The second  pr oblemat ic ca se  is  tha t  of a m or tgage  bank ing
company tha t  bor rows  fu nds  from a  fin ancia l in st it u t ion
(typically  a  commercia l bank) on  a  “war ehou se” line of cred it
and,  as  collat era l for r e pa y men t  of the cr ed it , p led ges  loa ns
from its existin g portfolio. The per iod covered by the pledge is
likely to be  sh or t—pe rhaps  30 to 120 d ays—since  the
exp ect a t ion  of all pa rt ies is  th at  th e m ort gage  banker will find a
permanent in ves tor  for  th e loan s or will  securitize them as soon
as a su fficient ly large group of them h ave been originated.
When  th at  per ma nen t d isposi t ion  of the  loans  is  made,  the
notes  will be retrieved  from th e “war ehouse” lender. However , if
the mort gage ban ker  accepts pa yment s in t he m ean tim e, has no
clear au thor i ty from the  “warehouse” l ender  to do so,  and  fa ils
t o rem it th e paym ent s to th e “war ehouse” lender,  it s
subsequen t insolvency may cau se th e “war ehouse” lender t o
demand paym ent  from th e mort gagor a second tim e.133 Aga in ,
the pr oble m st em s fr om the fa ct  tha t  th ese t r ansact ions  a re
ind ividua lly negot ia ted  and t ha t  ther e is  no st anda rd p ract ice
with  res pect t o design at ion of the  mor tgagee as  the “war ehouse”
bank’s agen t  for  pu rp oses of collection. More over, m ort gage
banke r s ar e typically finan cially th e weak est m ember s of the
mor tgage origin at ing in du st ry, a nd  hen ce th e m ost lik ely t o
become ins olvent  in tim es of financial st ress .
C. Ch an gin g the R ule for N on-N egotia ble N otes : the Mortgages
R estat em ent
 When  Pr ofessor Gr an t Nelson a nd I wer e serv ing as
repor t e r s for  the Res ta tement (Th ir d ) of Property (Mortgages),
we in it ia lly  de cided  to adop t  an  across-the-boar d posit ion
rejectin g the p aym en t  ru le for  bot h  negot ia ble  and n on-
negot iable notes. In  its pla ce, we proposed th e prin ciple tha t
“per formance of the obligat ion t o th e t ra ns feror  is effective
against  the tr ansferee if rendered before t he obligor r eceives
not ice of t he  t rans fe r .”134 Wit h  res pe ct  to negot iable paper ,  the
prov is ions of UCC Article 3 dis cuss ed ea rlier  in t his  a r t icle
seemed  to stand in  ou r  wa y; a ft er  a ll,  a  Rest a tem en t  cannot
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135. S ee text  accompa nyin g supra no te ?  t o ? .
136. S ee RESTATEMEN T (THIRD ) O F  P ROP ER TY (MO R TG A GE S) § 5.5 (Te nt at ive  Dr aft
No. 5, 1 996 ).
137. The following comments a re repr esenta tive:
I think th at your analysis is  a  bit disingenu ous. The combinat ion of 3-601(b)
a n d 3-602(a) makes it  pretty clear that payment  to a party that  is n ot
entitled  to enforce th e inst ru men t does n ot discha rge t he pa yor. It is
difficult to credit  your s uggest ion th at  3-602(a) is ar ticula tin g a n onexclusive
rule: th at  pa ym en t t o a h olde r is  bu t on e of th e typ es of paym ent  th at  will
discha rge  the pa yor. If that  were th e case, why wou ld it  say there was a
discha rge  “to t he  ex tent  payment is m ade *** to a person entitled to
en force .” Fur the rmore , your  ru l e p roduces  the odd  r e su l t  t ha t  paymen t  t o
a  holder-in-due-course does  not  re su lt i n a  dis cha rg e if t he  not e
subs eque nt ly is assigned w it h o u t no t ice o f t he  paymen t , bu t  t ha t  paymen t
to a per son wit h n o inter est in  th e not e at  all does  result in  a discharge.
Letter  fr om  P rofessor Ronald Ma nn, P rofessor, Washingt on Univer sity School of Law,
to Gra nt  S. Nels on,  Professor, UCLA Sch ool of Law 1-2 (Apr. 5, 1996) (on file with
the au th or). “I suspect t ha t your  ima gina tive rea ding of UCC  Art icle 3  in t he  effort
to reach th e result in  Restat eme n t  M or t g a ges § 5 .5 wi ll st ri ke  mos t r ea der s wh o ar e
a t  all familiar with commercial law as a t best t endent ious, in any event u npe rsua sive,
and at  worst , just  plain  silly.” L e t t er  fr om J am es S te ven  Roger s, P rofe ssor , Bost on
College Law Sch ool, to Dale A. Whitman, Pr ofessor, Brigham Young Univers ity Law
Sch ool 1 (Ma y 8,  199 6) (on  file  wit h a ut ho r).
I th in k t ha t u nd er  ar ti cle  3 , b ot h  old a nd  ne w, pa ym en t t o a n on-h olde r (or ,
under  th e r evis ed a rt icle, t o a n on-p er son  en tit led to en force) is ineffective
to discha rge a n obligat ion on a n egotiable instrum ent. Article 3 displaces
the field  he re . It  re flect s on e of t he  tr ad iti ona l dis t inct ions  in  Amer ican  law
between  negotia ble inst ru men ts a nd ot her  mone ta ry obl iga t ions:  t he
obliga tion  of an  obligor  on a  ne gotiable ins tr um en t r un s t o th e h olde r (n ow
PETE), whe the r  or  no t  i t  is  a  holder in due cour se; b ut  th e obli gor  on a
simp le con t rac t  may dea l with  the  or igina l obligee  un til  not ified  to t he
con t r a ry .
change the U CC. Neve r thele ss , we  de cided  to make t he
tech nica l a rgument  tha t  the  UCC never  makes  payment  t o t he
possessor of the  ins t rument  the  exclusive means of discha rgin g
it , and hence that  payment to the original mortgagee shou ld
also be  rega rde d a s a n  accep table  met hod of d ischa rge, even
when  th e note is negotiable a nd governed by Art icle 3.135
We were a ble  to convin ce t he m ajor it y of t he  Advi sor s on  the
project and persua de th e Coun cil of th e Amer ican  Law  In st itu te
(“A.L.I.”) that  our position was plau sible. However, when t he
t en ta t ive d ra ft 136 was  pu blish ed t o th e A.L.I. mem ber sh ip in
pr epa ra tion  for  the  annua l meet ing a t  w h ich  it would be
discussed  and voted upon, we received a n um ber of commen ts
from comm ercial law t eacher s a t t ack ing  our  approach .  Our
a rgumen t , i n t heir  view, wa s sim ply too t echn ica l  and was
con t r a ry to th e common  un der st an din g of Art icle 3.137 When  the
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E-ma il from St even H ar ris, P rofessor, U niver sity of Michigan La w Sch ool, t o Da le A.
Whitman , P rofessor, Brigh am  Young Un iversit y Law S chool (April 12, 199 6) (on file
with  au thor ) . I n  a ddition, the report ers for the Article 9 Drafting Committee pr epared
a  mem ora ndu m for Willia m M. Bu rk e, Cha irm an  of the C omm itt ee, i n  wh i ch  t hey
stated,  “Section 5.5 of the R estat emen t [tenta tive draft] adopts th e notification ru le,
even as to negotiable instr umen ts. By suggesting tha t th e ma k e r  of  a  nego t iab le  note
can  discharge its ob li ga t ion by paying someone other than  the person ent itled to
enforce, § 5.5 conflicts wit h  A r ti cle 3.” Memoran dum from St even Har ris & Char les
W. Mooney, J r., Repor ter s, to William  Bur ke, Chair, Article 9 Drafting Committee 4
( Ju ly 10,  199 6) (on  file  wit h a ut ho r).
138. F o r example ,  “Insofar  as  it  imposes  a  r isk  on an  obligor who, before  payin g,
fails t o determ ine who has possession of the paper, th e notion of reification (monetar y
claim  travels with the piece of paper) may be undesir a b le  in  some s ett ings.” E-ma il
from  Pr ofessor S teve n H ar ris, supra no te  137 . “[T] h e d r a fting committee r ecognized
tha t  ther e is some mer it to applying t he ru le of existing an d dra ft § 9-318
(‘noti ficat ion  ru le’), which  § 5.5 of t he  Res ta te me nt  ad opt s for  mor tga ge obl iga tion s.”
Memorandum from Steven Har ris & Char les W. Mooney, supra not e 137, a t 3. “I
raise th e poi nt  not  beca us e I op pose  your  su bst an tiv e r efor m ,  wh i ch  is a good one.
I ra ise  it b eca us e I fe ar  th at  your  pr oject  ma y r un  int o a h eadwind of tr ad iti ona l
bills-and-notes  an alyst s.” Lett er fr om P rofessor  Rona ld Ma nn , supra note 137, at  2.
ma tt er  came before the h ouse at  t h e  a n n ua l  meet ing , t he  same
object ion s were made. In the face of this opposit ion, we felt
obliged to back down. It is likely th at  if we had rem ained
adaman t , the membersh ip would simply  h a ve r efu se d t o vot e
favor ably  for  the s ect ion  in  qu es t ion .
Our  fall-back str at egy was to leave th e section in place, but
to simply exem pt  negot ia ble  notes  from it s cover age.  Up on our
assurance to t he m emb ers hip  a t  t h e ann ua l meeting t ha t we
would  do so in  the fina l dr a ft , ou r  se ct ion  wa s a pp roved  wit hout
sign ifica n t  diss en t . In ter es t in gly, n ot  one of t hose  res is t in g ou r
init ial  inclus ion of negotia ble notes in t he R estat em ent section
objected on  the m er it s.  In de ed , seve ra l of ou r  most  vigor ous
crit ics freely conceded that  what we had a ttempt ed to do was
desira ble;138 i t  was, in their view, simply beyon d t he p ower  of
any gr oup excep t  the d ra fter s of t h e  UC C t o cha nge . Thu s, t he
effect  of section 5.5 is t o abr ogat e th e pa ymen t r ule on ly in t he
cont ext of non-negotiable note.
D. Chan ging th e Rule for Negotiable Notes: Th e UCC
Am endm ent Process
 Being  right  is no guar an tee of su cces s.  In  the d iscuss ion s I
h a v e held  with m an y influentia l lawyers in t he pa st few year s
about  th e pa ymen t r ule, n ot one of th em h as  disa gree d t ha t it
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139. Of th e si x m em ber s of t he  J EB , tw o ar e a ppoi nt ed b y th e N at iona l
Con fer en ce of Comm issioner s on U niform  Sta te La ws, two by t he Rea l Pr opert y,
Probat e, an d Tr us t S ect ion of t he  Ame ri can  Ba r As socia tion , an d two by the  Amer ican
College of Real Est at e Lawye rs. My a ppoin t me nt  wa s by  th e la st  orga niz at ion
men t ioned, but  in m y exper ience, t he posit ions t ake n by t he J EB’s memb ers  ha ve
little  o r n o r e la t i on s h ip  t o t h e  pa r t ic ul a r  or g a n iz a t io n t h a t  a pp oi n t ed  t h em .
s h ou l d be  reve rse d.  Yet  change in  the r u le w it h  res pe ct  t o
negot iable n otes h as  been  su rp ris ingly difficult t o at ta in.
Shor t ly after  complet ing work on  th e Res ta tement (Th i rd) of
Property (Mortgages) in 199 7, I becam e a m emb er of th e J oint
Editor ia l Boar d on Rea l Pr opert y Acts  (th e “JE B”). This  sm all
gr oup of experienced rea l esta te lawyer s139 is  assigned the task
of ensu r in g t ha t  a ll of t he p roject s con du cted  by t he N at ion a l
Con fer en ce of Commissioners  on Uniform Sta te  Laws take
ap pr opria tely  in to account  the  needs  and int e res t s  of the  rea l
e st a t e ma rk et a nd  its  pa rt ici pa n t s. In a  mee tin g of th e J EB in
November  1997, it  became a pp aren t  tha t  ther e was s t rong
int erest  on  th e par t of its mem bers in  am endin g UCC Article 3
to change t he p aym en t  ru le for  negot ia ble  in st rumen ts a lon g
the lin es ta ken  in th e Restatem ent (Th ird) of Property
(Mortgages). Richar d Goldberg, a distinguished real estate
lawye r wit h t he  law fir m of Ballar d Sp ah r An dr ews & In gers oll
in  Ph ilad elph ia, m et w ith  the  JEB on  tha t  occas ion  and
encoura ged it to ta ke a s tr ong sta nd on t he m at ter .
Unfortu na tely, Article 3 had been revised only seven  yea r s
ea r li er , and  th ere wa s no active drafting committee assigned to
Art icle 3  a t t he time. However, a revision of Article 9 was
nea rin g completion un der t he dir ection of report ers Ch ar les
Mooney of th e Un ivers ity of Pen ns ylvan ia a nd  Steven Harr is of
Chicago-Kent  College of Law. H ar ris m et wit h t he J EB on  the
same occasion. The J EB a tt emp t ed  to per suade  h im to
incorpora t e such  a  change in Article 9. Harris resisted doing so.
He ar gued t ha t t he scope of Article 9 is limit ed to collater al
a s s ignmen t s of notes; it sim ply does  not  cover out righ t
a s s ignmen t s or  sa les  of notes, which ar e dealt  with only by
Art icle 3. Hen ce, if the Art icle 9 Dra fting Committ ee were t o
follow  th e J EB’s ur ging, they would eith er h ave to pr oduce a
fr agmen ta ry solu t ion , cover in g on ly coll a ter a l a ss ign men ts,  or
would  ha ve to dra stically exp a n d Art icle 9 in a  wa y th at
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140. S ee Memora ndum  from Steven  Har ris an d Charles  W. Mooney, J r., supra
no te 137.  Don ald  J . Ra pson , Ass ist an t G en er al C oun sel  of t he CI T Grou p, a la rge
commer cial lender, proposed t o the Article 9 Dra fting Committ ee tha t Article 9 be
revised to include all sales of instru ment s, whether  negotiable or non-negotiable.
Memorandum from Don ald J . Raps on, As s is t a n t  Gen era l Coun sel, CIT  Grou p, In c.,
t o Article 9 Dr aftin g Comm itt ee (Feb. 2, 199 8) (on file with au th o r). If this were done,
the notice requiremen t of § 9-318, which curren tly governs account s and cha ttel
paper , would presuma bly apply to instrum ent s as we ll, thus overriding th e payment
ru le of U.C.C. § 3-603 with re sp ect  to n egot iab le in st ru me nt s. H oweve r, R ap son ’s
p r oposa l wou ld h av e con st it ut ed a  ra th er  ra dica l ch an ge in  th e s cope  of Art icle  9 , a n d
it  was not m et with en thu siasm by th e Article 9 Drafting Commit tee.
141. Pr ofess or  Miller suggested tha t th e Article 9 Drafting Commit tee  consider
and deve lop  an Art icle 3 amendment a fter seeking input from affected industry
groups du ring ea rly 1998. H owever, h e recognized  th at  th e Article 9 Com mit tee m ight
ult ima tely  fai l t o ap pr ove t he  de sir ed  Art icle 3 amen dme nt . S ee Mem ora nd um  from
Fred  H. Mille r t o K. King Bu rn ett , Ch a ir, Committee on P rogram a nd Scope,
Na t iona l Conferen ce of Commissione rs on  Un iform St at e Laws  (Ja n. 5, 1998) (on file
with  au thor ) .
142. S ee M em o ra n d u m  from Ca rl  H. L ism an , Co-ch air , J oint  Ed itor ial  Boa rd  for
Uni fo rm Real P roper ty Acts, t o th e Comm itt ee on S cope an d Pr ogra m, N at i on a l
Con ference of Commission ers  on Un iform St at e Laws  (Oct. 21, 1997) (on file wit h
au thor ) .
143. This  viewpoint was expr essed in a  letter  to the J EB:
If the Article 9 Revis ions  ar e a ppr oved  an d a dopt ed w ith out  th e
s imu l taneous incl us ion i n t he  Code  (wh et he r Ar ticl e 3 or  9) of a p rov ision
l ike th e on e we  ha ve p rop ose d, t he  pr act ica l opp ort un it y t o ach ieve our
desired  r e s ul t  m ay be forever  lost. I t hin k we m ust  do everyt hin g possible
to insist th at t he Article 9 Revis ions no t be finally approved and adopted
unless and  un t il  ou r  p r op os a l (or  ano the r  one  having the  same re su lt )
r e la t ing to payment s on mortgage-secu r e d  n ote s  is  a lso approved  and
adopted  with  th e sam e degr ee of formalit y an d finalit y.
Letter  from  Robe rt  M. Bu rg er  of May er , Br own  & P lat t, C hica go, Illin ois ,  to the  JEB
ser iously encroached on  Ar t icle 3’s  p rov ince . Har r i s was
un ders ta nda bly reluctan t t o do either .140
Professor  Fred  Mil ler  of th e Univer sit y of Oklah oma , th e
execut ive di rect or  of the N at ion a l Con fer en ce of Commissioner s
on  Uniform S ta te Laws , then  s u gges ted  to the  JEB tha t  an
amendment to Article 3 be prepa r ed to dea l  wi th  the i ssue
compr eh en sively.  He agr eed to work wit h i n the  Confe rence  to
seek  it s a dop t ion  as a  pa r t  of the p ackage w hich  wou ld  con ta in
the new vers ion of Article 9.141 I p rep ared  a  pr elimin ary dr a ft  of
such  an  am en dm en t, with in put  from Miller and  severa l other
experienced commercia l l aw teachers and  p ract i t ioners,  and the
JEB suppor t ed i t .142 The JEB and  it s  suppor te r s  sensed tha t  the
pendency of th e Article 9 draft pr ovided considera ble polit ica l
lever age  in obtain ing app roval of an  am endm ent  to Article 3
an d th at  it was  import an t t o keep th e two tied t ogether. 143
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and oth er  in te re st ed  pa rt ies  (J an . 14 , 19 98) (on  file  wit h a ut ho r).
144. S ee Memora ndum  from Neil B. Cohen, Pr ofessor, Brooklyn Law S chool, to
the Ad H oc Su bcom mi tt ee  on  Pa ym en t of S ecu re d N ote s (F eb. 27, 1998) (on file with
au thor ) . Cohen’s draft differed from  m ine in  th at  he pr oposed to cha nge t he la ngu age
of existin g U.C.C. § 3-602  (an d m ak e a  few m inor  mod ificat ions  in ot he r s ect ions  of
Article  3), rather t han  adopt th e change in a n ew section as I had done.
145. S ee Memor an dum  from Art icle 3/9 Task  Force t o the  Article 9 Dr aftin g
Commi t t ee (Ma r.  2, 1 998 ) (on fi le w it h a ut ho r).
146. The negative vote occurr ed during t he Dra fting Committee ’s final m eetin g
on  Ma rch  20-22 , 199 8. Rich ar d Gold ber g, wh o at te nd ed t he  me et ing  on b eh alf of  t he
JEB an d oth er pr oponent s of the ch an ge, spoke vigor ously in it s  fa v or ,  a n d was
deeply  dis ap poin te d by t he  comm itt ee’s r efu sa l to t ak e a ction . (Persona l conv er sa tion s
between  Gold ber g a nd  th e a ut ho r).
147. Pr ofess or  Mille r’s r efocus  on  the Article 1 Commit tee ha d been foreshadowed
in  Ja nua ry 1998, when h e proposed giving initial aut hority over an Article 3
amendmen t  to the Article 9 Drafting Committ ee. He had wr itten:
If [the Ar ticle 9 Comm itt ee does n ot act  on th e proposa l], I believe the
mat ter  can be furth er delegated as a ma tter  wit hin  th e coor din at ion
fun ction  of the U CC Article 1 comm it tee for  fu r the r  s tudy and  appropr i a t e
act ion  at a  later t ime (presuma bly when  revise d Article 1 a nd coordin at ing
amendmen t s ar e r ea dy i n 2 000 ).
Memorandum from F red H . Miller, P rofessor, U niver sity of Okla homa Colle ge of Law,
to K. King Bu rn et t,  Ch ai r,  Com mi tt ee on  Pr ogr am  an d S cope , Na ti ona l Con fer en ce
of Com mi ss ion er s on  Un ifor m S ta te  La ws  (J an . 5,  199 8) (on  file  wit h a ut ho r).
The Ar t icle 9 Dra fting Committ ee appoint ed an  inter na l
task  force to consider  wheth er a nd h ow to adopt an  Article 3
amendmen t . Pr ofessor N eil B. Cohe n of Brooklyn  Law  School, a
mem ber  of t ha t  t a sk force , p repa red  a  dra ft  amendmen t  ba sed
to some exten t on m y earlier  d r a ft .144 The amendment  was
t roub ling to some  members  of t he t as k force, h owever , an d
ultim at ely to the en tire Art icle 9 Dra ft ing Commit tee. They
ar gued tha t , if t he p aym en t  ru le n eede d t o be  modi fied  for
p romissory notes secured by m ort gages, perh aps  it sh ould be
modified for t hose secured  by persona l propert y as well, or even
for  unsecured not e s.145 But , no input  ha d been pr ovided by
commer cial la w p ract it ion er s ou t side  of the rea l esta te pr actice,
and th ere was a n un derst an dable relucta nce to move forwa rd
with  an  am end men t coverin g all n otes w ith out  giving it  th is
broader  consider at ion. Ult ima tely t he Ar ticle 9 Dr aft ing
Committ ee refused t o approve an y Article 3 amend men t. 146
Professor  Miller then  devised yet a t h ird  approach ,  and  one
tha t  seem s a t t his  wr itin g to h ave  a good cha nce of su ccess. A
new dr aft ing comm itt ee for Art icle 1 ha d jus t b een  orga n ized,
and Miller proposed inviting it t o consider t h a t  a n  amendment
to th e paym ent  ru le be inser ted in  Article 3.147 Th is  move was
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148. S ee E-ma il from N eil B. Cohe n, P rofessor , Br o ok l yn  La w Sch ool, t o th e
au thor  (Mar . 25, 1998 ) (on file with aut hor) (describing Cohen’s draft am endmen t to
Article  3). Coh en ’s dr aft  covered  ne goti ab le n ote s se cur ed b y bot h r ea l an d pe rs ona l
p rope r ty and pledged as collateral but  did not cover unsecured notes. He noted:
There seem  to be t wo schools of though t a mong t hose wh o are  payin g
at te nt ion  to the iss ue  from  th e U CC s ide . On e gr oup  wou ld p re fer  a b roa d
brush  approach, chan ging the law in all cases. Th e ot he r  group wan t s  t o
a void solutions that  are in sea rch of a problem and would prefer to addres s
the m a tter  only in the context wher e it has been  alleged to have caused
problems.
Id .
149. S ee id .
150. S ee articles cited supra note 5.
151. S ee Rubin , supra note 5.
not  as odd as it  ma y se em , for  ther e is  a  lon g t radi t ion  among
the Commissioner s of perm ittin g Article 1 dra fting comm ittees
to range b road ly  over  the ent ire UCC,  clean ing up  mat ter s  tha t
need  coord ina t ion .
Fort un at ely, Pr ofessor Neil B. Cohen, who had  p repared  the
amendment t o Art icle 3 which th e Article 9 Drafting Comm ittee
refused  to adopt, is a lso the Cha ir of the Article 1 Draft ing
Committ ee. There  is  good  indica tion th at  Pr ofessor Cohen
believes chan ge is needed  and tha t  the  Ar t i cle 1  Draft ing
Commi t tee can  accompli sh  tha t  change  wi thou t  d iffi cu l ty .148
That is now where the  mat ter  s t ands.  Aga in ,  there  has been  no
disse n t from the p ropos it ion  tha t  change i s d es ir able , or  a t
wors t h ar mle ss, in  th e cont ext  of mort gage  not es. Th e deba te is
over  the  breadth  and  na tu re of the  change.149
V. F I N A L  RE F L E C TI O N S
 As several recent  writers have observed,150 Article 3 and  the
negot iabilit y concept h ave been  rem ar ka bly resist an t t o cha nge.
Vast changes  have occu r red  in  the t ech nology a nd cu st omary
opera t ion  of paym ent  system s since negot iability was  fleshed
out  in  the eighteen th  an d nin eteen th  centu ries, but  Article 3
has taken little account of them. This is a str a n ge  phenomenon
and, perh aps , reflect s  r eluctance  to change a  set  of ru les  tha t
seem t o fun ction sat isfactorily most of th e time.
Professor  Edward Rubin  has  documented  the enormous
sign ifica nce of Lord Man sfield’s role in th e creat ion  of the
presen t -day law of negotiable instrum ents.151 Mansfield
assem bled a “jur y” of experie nced  bus ine ss p eople of his d ay.
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152. Id . at 786.
153. Equ ity Bank  v. Gonsalves, 691 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Con n .  Supe r . C t . 1996) . The
cour t  re ma nd ed t he  cas e for  fur th er  find ing s, bu t a dm onis he d t he  tr ial  cour t t ha t
sin ce foreclosure proceedings are equitable in nature, it  shou l d “c on side r  a ll  t he
equities  in  de cidi ng w het her  to e n ter  a  for ec losure. ” Id .
They me t  r egula rly at  th e Gu ildh all in  Lon don  to advise h im  on
actua l comm ercial pra ctice, for h e wished t o be su re t ha t h is
ru l ings wou ld not  confl ict  wi t h  or  imp air  th e legitim at e
exp ect a t ion s of the business commu nit y th ey affecte d. As
Professor  Rubin  pu ts  it, Ma ns field “un der st ood tha t comm ercia l
law  must  be b ase d on  an  unde rst anding of under lying
com m e r ci al pr act ice,  bu t  a lso tha t  th is  unde rst anding wi ll n ot
yield significant results un less animated by a sense of socia l
policy.”152 If Ma ns field wer e a live today, an d became a cquaint ed
with  today’s  commercia l p ractices , I believe he would be
app alled a t  how la rge a  ga p s ep ara tes  the p aym en t  ru le fr om
bu sin ess  expect at ions a nd  soun d social p olicy.
It  is a bun da nt ly clea r  t h a t m odern  judges  ar e acu tely
un comforta ble with  the  payment  ru le and  tha t t hey ar e willing
to go a  fa r  d is t ance  ou t  of t he wa y t o avoid  it . A r ecen t  opin ion
by a  Connect icu t  judge  pu t  i t  th is  way:
T o t h is cou rt  th at  re as on [t ha t t he  m ak er  can  pr otect  him self
by de m an din g p rod u ction  of t h e  i n s tr u m e n t  a n d  r e fu s i n g t o
pay  a  p a r t y  no t  i n  posses s ion  o f  it ]  does  no t  make  sen se  a s  t o a
m o r tg a ge  no te  pa yab le  mont h ly .  A mor tgagor  can not  be
expec ted e v er y  m o n t h  h e  m a k e s  a  p a y m e n t  t o a s k  a  mor tga gee
b a n k to  pr ove  h is p oss es sion  of th e n ot e. M or eov er , if t h e
m o r tg a gor  pa ys m on th ly  to t he  m ort ga gee  a s elf-am ort izin g
m o r tg a ge  n o te  t o t h e  da t e  of m a t u rit y, sh ould  not  pa ym en t in
full  i n  th a t  m a n n e r  fa il  t o  b e  a com ple te  de fen se  to a n  act ion
b y  a n  a s s ignee  o f  t he  mor t gagee  who  neve r  ga ve  no t i ce  of th e
a s s ig n m e n t ?153
I would not ar gue th at  Article 3 is in crisis. I mer ely suggest
tha t , in its perpetuation of the paym en t  ru le,  it  is  se r iou sly ou t
of t ouch with  modern  life an d th at  th is deta chmen t somet im es
imposes rea l an d se vere har dships on ordinary people. It  must
be chan ged.
